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IMPLEMENTATION OF 30-YEAR LAND USE RIGHTS
FOR FARMERS UNDER CHINA'S 1998 LAND
MANAGEMENT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON A 17 PROVINCE
SURVEY
Roy Prosterman*
Brian Schwarzwalder*"
Ye Jianping'**
Abstract: Recent legal and policy measures demonstrate the commitment of
China's central leadership to the development and implementation of a legal framework
providing long-term, secure land tenure to its nearly 800 million farmers. The results of a
17 province, 1,621 household survey conducted in August 1999 show that considerable
progress has already been made toward this goal. However, a number of key issues
related to both the implementation of existing legal rules and the development of
additional legislation addressing rural land rights must be addressed for the process to be
complete.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Beginning with the adoption of the revised 1998 People's Republic of

China ("PRC") Land Management Law' ("Land Management Law") by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on August 29, 1998,
China has embarked on one of the largest and most important land tenure
reform programs in history with the goal of providing nearly 200 million
farm households with the land tenure security necessary for long-term,
productivity-enhancing investments in their land. As other successful land
tenure reform programs have demonstrated, the benefits from increased
investment resulting from greater land tenure security are tremendous, and
Roy Prosterman is Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law and President
of the..Rural Development Institute in Seattle, Washington.
Brian Schwarzwalder is Staff Attorney and China Country Coordinator at the Rural Development
Institute.

Ye Jianping is Professor of Land Management at Renmin University in Beijing.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Jeffrey M. Riedinger, Professor of Political
Science at Michigan State University, in the development of the survey, analysis of its results, and the
presentation of those results in the present paper.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanlifa (Xiuzheng) [Land Administration Law of the
People's Republic of China (Revised)] (adopted June 25, 1986, amended Dec. 29, 1988 and Aug. 29, 1998)
[hereinafter Land Management Law] translatedin Rural Development Institute ("RDI") document (on file
with authors).
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include increased agricultural productivity, higher farmer incomes, increased
rural consumption, and, particularly important to China, the development of
a rural market for goods and services, and an end of current deflation.
However, in order to realize these potential benefits, existing legal and
policy provisions concerning land tenure security must be effectively
implemented, and new legislation must be adopted that provides additional
protection of farmers' land use rights. The core elements of China's
ongoing rural land tenure reform program can be found in Article 14 of the
Land Management Law. Article 14 of the law requires that collectivelyowned arable land be contracted to members of the collective economic unit
for a term of 30 years, and that a written contract be executed containing the
rights and duties of the collective landowner and the contracting farm
household.
In addition to mandating 30-year use rights for collectively owned
arable land, Land Management Law Article 14 also attempts to provide
greater assurance for those rights by restricting the practice of land
readjustments, the single greatest threat to land tenure security since
collectively-owned arable land was allocated to farm households under the
Household Responsibility System. Article 14 prohibits the conduct of big
2 and limits the conduct
land readjustments,
of small readjustments to
3
"isolated cases." Following the adoption of the 1998 Land Management
Law, the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 15th Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Third Plenary Session
Decision) reiterated the central government's desire to provide additional
assurance for farmers' new 30-year land use rights by calling for the
implementation of "long-term, protected rural land use rights" and the
drafting of additional legislation to protect such rights.4

2 Two general types of land readjustments exist in China: "big" or comprehensive readjustments,
and "small" or partial readjustments. Big readjustments involve an overall change in the landholdings of
all households in the village. In a big readjustment, all farmland in the village is given back to the
collective landowner and reallocated among village households so each household receives entirely
different land. A small readjustment consists of adding to or taking from a household's existing
landholding when that household's size changes.
3 Land Management Law, supra note 1,art. 14. Article 14 allows only "appropriate isolated
readjustments of land" during the 30-year land use term based on the approval of at least two-thirds of the
villager assembly, or two-thirds of the villager representatives, and approval by the administrative agency
responsible for agriculture at the township and county levels.
4 See Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiwu Jie Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Di Sanci Quanti Huiyi,
Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Nongye he Nongcun Gongzuo Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding
[Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on Several
Major Issues in Agriculture and Rural Work] (adopted Oct. 14, 1998) translated in RDI document (on file
with authors).
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Just prior to the January 1, 1999 effective date of the Land
Management Law, the Decision of the 1998 Central Rural Work Meeting
announced the goal that 30-year rural land use rights should be "fully
implemented" throughout China prior to the end of 1999. The Herculean
nature of this goal embodies both the importance attached to rural land
tenure security by the central government as well as its commitment to
seeing it achieved in practice.
Systematic monitoring can make a crucial difference to the success of
implementing any legal or policy measure of substantial scope. Given the
extent of the task and the short timetable established by the Decision of the
1998 Central Rural Work Meeting, the importance of systematic monitoring
is especially relevant to the implementation of 30-year rural land use rights
in China. Without such monitoring, it is impossible to ascertain the true
nature or extent of implementation and the need for refinements to the
implementation process. In the context of China's ongoing rural land tenure
system reforms, systematic monitoring of implementation of 30-year rural
land use rights, and of the impact of such rights as presently defined in law
and policy documents upon farmers' land tenure security, 5 also plays a vital
role in informing the development of forthcoming legislation related to rural
land use rights.
This paper discusses the results of a 1,621 household random sample
survey on the implementation of 30-year rural land use rights and farmers'
land tenure security conducted by the Rural Development Institute ("RDI")
and Renmin University in 17 Chinese provinces in July and August, 1999.
The survey's goal was to assess the extent and nature of implementation of
30-year rural land use rights, and, based on that assessment, develop a set of
conclusions and recommendations concerning the ongoing land tenure
reform process. Analysis of the survey results indicates both that China has
made remarkable progress in the process of implementing 30-year rural land
use rights and that crucial issues must still be addressed to ensure that
China's 870 million farmers receive long-term land tenure security.
The development and methodology of the survey is described in detail
in Part II. Part III presents the national survey results. Part IV presents the
survey results on a province-by-province basis. Finally, based on the survey
results, Part V contains a series of conclusions and provides specific
recommendations concerning the ongoing implementation of 30-year rural

That is, do the rights as presently defined sufficiently meet the need for farmers to have long-term
tenure security, so as to lead to the intended benefits.
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land use rights as well as on the development of forthcoming legislation on
rural land use rights.
II.

SURVEY DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY

A.

Survey Development
As early as November 1998, less than three months after the adoption

of the Land Management Law and prior to its effective date, various media
outlets in China publicized claims by high-level officials from several
provinces that over 90% of villages within their provinces had already
completely implemented 30-year rural land use rights.6 Although some
provinces had begun implementation of 30-year land use rights under the
terms of Central Committee Document No. 16 of 1997, 7 "Notice Concerning

Further Stabilizing and Protecting the Rural Land Contracting Relationship"
("Document No. 16"), which required that 30-year rural land use rights be
introduced upon expiration of farmers' previous 15-year land use rights,8 it
seemed highly unlikely that such a high level of implementation could have
been achieved in any individual province by the end of 1998.

6
For example, the Vice-Governor of Anhui Province claimed in a front-page China Daily article
that 98.2% of villages province-wide had completed implementation of 30-year use rights to rural land.
See CHINA DAILY, Dec. 14, 1998, availablein LEXIS, Asia Intelligence Wire.
Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting, Guowuyuan Bangongting, Guanyu Jinyibu Wending he
Wanshan Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Guanxi de Tongzhi [General Office of the CPC Central Committee &
the General Office of the State Council, Central Committee Document No. 16, Notice Concerning Further
Stabilizing and Protecting the Rural Land Contracting Relationship] (issued Aug. 27, 1997) [hereinafter
Central Committee Document No. 16], translated in RDI document (on file with authors). Central
Committee Document No. 16, contained the following language concerning the implementation of 30-year
rural land use rights: "When the first-round land contracting term expires, the land contracting term shall be
extended for another 30 years . . .The extension of the contracting term for another 30 years is
implemented based on the first-round land contracting."
8 In 1984, the Communist Party Central Committee issued Rural Work Document 1 urging local
officials to: "... . prolong the time period of the contracted land, encourage the peasants to increase their
investment to foster the fertility of the soil and practice intensive operation. In general, the time period of the
contracted land should be more than 15 years. Projects with a long production cycle and of development
nature, such as fruit trees, woods and forests, denuded hill, and waste land, should have a larger contract
period."
A Chinese Communist Party Central Committee decision published in November 1993 stated that
the term for contracting land may be extended another 30 years upon expiration of the original 15-year land
use term. Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan Guanyu Dangqian Nongye he Nongcun Jingji Fazhan de
Ruogan Zhengce Cuoshi [CPC Central Committee & State Council, Document No. 11,Concerning Several
Current Policy Measures on Agricultural and Rural Economic Development] (issued Novermber 5, 1993),
translatedin RDI document (on file with authors).
Despite these repeated policy pronouncement, however, RDI's field research experience indicates
that the so-called 15-year use right policy originating in 1984 was never widely implemented.
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To assess the actual progress of implementation in one of the
provinces claiming a very high level of implementation of 30-year land use
rights, and whether such implementation conformed with the new provisions
of the Land Management Law, the authors conducted two days of targeted
Rapid Rural Appraisal fieldwork in Henan province in December 1998. 9
Our interview questions covered the entire range of issues relating to
implementation of farmers' 30-year use rights, from simple knowledge of
the policy (via TV or cadre announcements), to village meetings to discuss
the policy and to decide on a possible land readjustment during the
implementation process (big, small, or no readjustment), 0 to carrying out
that readjustment, signing and actually issuing 30-year land use right
contracts and land use right certificates, to the consistency of such contracts
and certificates with provisions of the new Land Management Law, to the
farmers' actual expectations that there would or would not be readjustments
during the 30-year use right period. We also asked about farmers' attitudes
towards the 30-year no readjustment policy.
The results of our 14 farmer interviews with respect to these key

implementation issues in Henan raised serious concerns that full
implementation, as measured by the issuance of an appropriate 30-year land
use right contract to farmers, had actually only occurred in a small minority
of villages." These results further underlined our doubts concerning various
provinces' public claims of nearly completed implementation, and appeared
9 Against the background of its work on rural land reform in 33 other countries, RDI has conducted
research on rural land tenure issues in China since 1987. In that time, RDI attorneys have conducted
interviews with over 700 farm households using Rapid Rural Appraisal techniques. In these Rapid Rural
Appraisal interviews, farmer interviewees are not respondents to a questionnaire, but active participants in
a semi-structured interview. The researchers use a checklist of issues as a basis for questions, not
necessarily addressing all questions in each interview and sometimes departing from the basic questions to
pursue interesting, unexpected, or new information. The RDI field researchers randomly select
interviewees, typically visiting one household at each stop. Researchers take extra measures to avoid the
company of local officials in order to maximize the candidness of interviewees. Typical interviews last
from one to two hours. In addition to these longer, more detailed surveys, RDI also cooperated with the
Ministry of Agriculture's National Rural Experimental Zone Office in the design and conduct of a 1,080
household survey in four counties of Fujian and Shaanxi provinces in December 1996.
Joining in the Henan Province Rapid Rural Appraisal fieldwork, co-author Ye Jianping has served
as Professor of Land Management at Renmin University since 1987. His primary research areas include
land information systems and land and real estate appraisal. He has acted as the Chinese land consultant to
the UNDP Sustainable Development for Small Townships project since March 1998.
10 For a description of the differences between big and small land readjustments see supra note 2.
The conduct of big readjustments during the process of implementation of 30-year rural land use rights is a
violation of central policies. See infra Part III.G.2.
1 In fact, full implementation could be claimed in only one of the 14 farmer interviews we
conducted. For a detailed discussion of our fieldwork findings see Roy Prosterman et al., Implementation
of 30-Year Use Rights for Rural Land in Henan Province: Fieldwork Results (December 16, 1998)
(unpublished Memorandum on file with the authors).
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to confirm the need for a more systematic assessment of the actual progress
of implementation of this vitally important program.
The need for broader and systematic assessment indicated that
preparations should be made to conduct a large, random-sample survey on a
nationwide basis. In this way, implementation could be measured in all its
major aspects, with quantifiable results that should reliably reflect both the
national and provincial situations. Thus, based on the list of questions used
in the December 1998 Henan fieldwork described above, in early 1999 the
authors jointly developed a more formal survey questionnaire for use in
systematic monitoring. Using a draft version of this questionnaire, RDI
Staff Attorney Brian Schwarzwalder and Renmin University Professor Ye
Jianping conducted a second round of fieldwork interviews in April and May
1999. This round of fieldwork served the dual purposes of further
preliminary evaluation of implementation of 30-year rural land use rights
and testing the draft questionnaire. During six days of fieldwork, the two
authors used the draft survey questionnaire to conduct 29 farmer household
interviews in 24 villages in 20 counties of Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, and
Jiangsu provinces, as well as Beijing Municipality.
Following this fieldwork, additional revisions were made to the
survey questionnaire to incorporate newly discovered issues and to ensure
that the range of alternative responses provided in the survey questionnaire
was sufficient to encompass the range of responses given by farmers during
fieldwork. Using this revised survey questionnaire, RDI Attorneys Roy
Prosterman and David Bledsoe, and RDI China Consultant Li Ping, with the
cooperation of the Development Research Center of the State Council,
conducted a third round of targeted fieldwork in Heilongjiang and Jilin
provinces in June 1999.
The three preliminary rounds of fieldwork just described yielded
important positive indications as well as underlining several potential
concerns. On the positive side, it seemed clear that the central government's
publicity campaign as to the new 30-year land use rights to which farmers
are entitled, had been highly successful. Nearly all farmers interviewed
reported that they had heard of the 30-year land use rights. With
considerable variation, depending on the timing of the fieldwork and the
province in which it was conducted, half or more of the villages in which we
had conducted fieldwork had begun the process of implementing 30-year
land use rights.
At the same time, however, the fieldwork also identified a variety of
issues related to the process of implementation of 30-year land use rights
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that posed a serious threat to farmers' long-term land tenure security. These
issues included:
1. Many villages had not yet begun the implementation process, and
in many that had, cadres had not involved farmers in the process of
implementing the new rights.
2. Even where 30-year land use contracts had been signed, the
contracts had sometimes been retained by township or village
officials and not physically issued to farmers.
3. Some contracts contained provisions that contemplated, or even
required, continuing land readjustments during the 30-year land
use term.
4. Some cadres had violated the Land Management Law and related

policy documents by withholding substantial amounts of arable
land from contracting to members of the village collective, under
the guise of Flexible Land, or of responsibility land within the

Two-Field System.
5. In violation of central policies, many villages had conducted big

readjustments during the process of implementing 30-year land use
rights.
6. But by far the most disturbing issue uncovered during this
preliminary fieldwork was that most farmers we interviewed were
not confident that they would receive the full 30-year land use term
to which they are entitled free from land readjustments. If this
were widely true, then most farmers would lack the assurance of
tenure security that would lead to additional investments on the
land, and the primary purpose of the Land Management Law in
granting 30-year land use rights would be defeated.
Against the backdrop of this preliminary fieldwork, the survey
questionnaire was finalized and the survey was carried out to further assess
the extent and nature of these positive and negative trends related to the
implementation of 30-year rural land use rights in China, to discover any
new issues related to implementation, and to develop a series of targeted
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recommendations designed to protect and increase farmers' land tenure
security.
B.

Survey Methodology

Our two basic goals in conducting the survey were: (1) to conduct a
survey of sufficient size to provide highly accurate data at the national level
on implementation of farmers' 30-year rural land use rights and (2) to make
the survey sample large enough to provide useful data on the relative
progress of implementation at the level of individual provinces.
Starting with the need for a sufficiently large sample size to give
useful results at the provincial level, we concluded that a sample size of 100
farmers in each province would be desirable. Such a sample provides results
that should be descritive of the situation in the entire province to an
accuracy of +/-9.8%.1 Because we decided that the survey should include
17 provinces our nationwide sample would be 1,700 households. In fact,
1,621 valid survey responses were returned by interviewers, a sufficient
national sample to give results that should be descriptive of the situation in
the 17 provinces as a whole to an accuracy of +/-2.4%.13
Two major factors were considered in selecting the actual survey
provinces from China's 31 provinces and province-level municipalities.
First, the survey provinces should represent all or nearly all of China's major
agricultural provinces. Second, the rural population of the survey provinces
should represent a large proportion of China's total rural population. Based
on these selection criteria, all seven of China's province-level municipalities
were eliminated, as were several western provinces with relatively low
agricultural population, including Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Gansu.
The 17 survey provinces include over 90% of China's approximately
197 million rural households.' 4 The 17 survey provinces were: Hebei, Jilin,
Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian, Hunan,
Hubei, Henan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Shaanxi.
12 That is at the "95% confidence level," i.e., the results should fall within that range in 95 out of 100
cases, if it were possible to take a complete census of every farm household in the province.
13 The +/-2.4% figure is calculated as follows: 1=1.96- .25/.
Once again, this should be the range
of accuracy in 95 cases out of 100. Seesupra note 12. Such a survey, giving results to within a range of
+/-2.4%, is quite large, and met our goal of a high degree of accuracy at the national level.

14 Using official estimates of rural population of 870 million in 1998 (see infra note 57) and the

average figure of 4.42 members per household from the 17-province survey would give a figure of

approximately 197 million rural households at that time. Based on official 1997 population figures, the 17
survey provinces contain approximately 186 million rural households, which would represent about 94% of
China's rural households.
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Once the 17 provinces had been selected, Renmin University students
from each of the survey provinces were selected as interviewers. Priority
was given to students from the Land Management Department with previous
training in rural land issues. Students attended a series of training sessions
provided by Renmin University Professor Ye Jianping in May and June
1999, and a two-day training course taught jointly by RDI researchers and
Professor Ye prior to the commencement of the survey.
The training emphasized several key elements derived from the
survey pre-testing as well as
Table 1. Survey Interviews by Province
experience gained in RDI's
interviews of over 700 farm
Province
Surveys Completed
households conducted throughout
Hebei
86
China since 1987. First, students
Jilin
100
were instructed on how to create a
Heilongjiang
95
survey atmosphere in which
Jiangsu
102

farmers

felt

comfortable

responding to questions freely and
honestly by asking farmers for
their voluntary participation in the

Anhui

78

Shandong

t00

Zhejiang

90
101

Jiangxi
Fujian

103

survey and treating them with
respect and courtesy.
Second,
students were taught to use
language and concepts that are
easily understood by farmers.

Hunan
Hubei
Henan

Third, and most importantly, the

Yunnan

69

training

Shaanxi
Total

104

emphasized

that

88
98
103

Guangxi

102

Sichuan

100

Guizhou

91

1,621
be
only
should
interviews
conducted away from local cadres,
whose presence could influence farmers' responses to the survey questions.
In addition to the training provided prior to the survey, one graduate student
from Renmin University's Land Management Department was designated as
team leader for each survey province. These team leaders were responsible
for coordinating students from that province and for responding to any
questions encountered by students in the process of administering the
survey.
Each student was asked to complete a minimum of 10 survey
questionnaires. Each interview was conducted with a randomly selected
household in a separate, randomly selected village. For each set of 10
questionnaires completed, survey interviews were conducted in a minimum
of five randomly selected townships in two or more counties. A total of
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1,621 valid survey questionnaires were returned, encompassing 1,621
villages 5 in over 350 counties of the 17 provinces. The number of valid
responses per province is expressed in Table 1.
To ensure that the combined results from all of the provinces,
discussed in Part III, are representative on a national level (or strictly
speaking, are representative for the 17 survey provinces which contain 90%
or more of China's rural population), the survey results from each province
have been weighted according to the share of rural population contained in
that individual province relative to the total rural population contained in the
17 survey provinces. No weighting is necessary (or possible), however,
when we separately present the results for each individual survey province.
Thus, in summary, the national survey results discussed in Part III and
throughout the paper are accurate for the combined rural population of the
17 provinces to within +/-2.4% in 95 out of 100 cases. The individual
province figures discussed in Part IV, below, represent the raw, unweighted
percentages, and are accurate for the rural population of that province to
within approximately +/-9.8% in 95 out of 100 cases. The survey was
conducted during the last half of July and the first half of August 1999. The
results therefore reflect the situation in the countryside as of that time.
III.

NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS

A.

Household Characteristics

The 1,621 farmers interviewed reported an average household size of
4.42 members and an average annual per capita income of 2,063 RMB
Yuan. An average household possessed 3.85 land shares with a per capita
land share size of 1.32 mu, 16 for an average household landholding size of
5.68 mu. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (65.1%) also reported that at
least one member of their household was currently engaged in nonagricultural employment. Figure 1 indicates farmers' reported income levels
relative to other village households.

13It should be noted that for nearly all of the factual questions addressed by the survey, the farmer's
response should be representative of the situation in that village as a whole. This is directly so in questions
such as, "Does your village have Flexible Land?," and indirectly so in questions such as, "Have you signed
a 30-year land use contract?," because village cadre carry out such tasks on a village-wide basis. From a
statistical standpoint, therefore, it is important that the number of villages in our sample is just as large as
the number of households.
16 The mu is a traditional Chinese unit of land measurement, equivalent to approximately 67 square meters,
or one-fifteenth of a hectare.
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Figure 1. Respondents' Reported
Income Level Relative to Other Village
Households
Above

High
2.21/

Figure 2. Has Village Conducted a Land
Readjustments Since Inception of HRS?

Below
-Average

4.5%

Yes
77.4%/

Don't
Know

4.6%
Average

B.

n=1619

Previous Land Readjustments

The survey results indicate that over three-quarters of villages have
conducted at least one land readjustment since the inception of the
Household Responsibility System ("HRS") (see Figure 2).
In 62.7% of the villages that had conducted at least one land
readjustment, farmers reported that the most recent land readjustment
occurred during or after 1996. The survey results further show that the most
recent land readjustments were divided almost equally between big
readjustments (50.8%) and small readjustments (49.2%).
C.

The Two-Field System

The survey results indicate that 65.2% of villages have never
employed the Two-Field System, while 17.6% currently employ it, and
17.2% previously employed the Two-Field System, but have subsequently
ended it. One important aspect of these results is that nearly half of the
villages that have ever employed the Two-Field System have subsequently
ended the practice. The survey findings further show a substantial decrease
in the percentage of villages employing the Two-Field System since 1997,
the year that Rural Work Document No. 16 was issued by the Central
Committee.17 From 1997 onward, the Two-Field System was introduced in
17 Central Committee Document No. 16 prohibited the introduction of the Two-Field System in any
villages that had not previously adopted it. See Central Committee Document No. 16, supra note 7.
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Methods
Burdens
Plus

Auction to
Highest

Contracting

Bidder

Fees

10.0%

1Sam as
Land
14.1%
Anyone

Who Covers
Burdens

Based on
Household

42.6%

Labor
17.4%/
n=273
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only 3.0% of the villages that

have ever introduced it, while
it was ended in 17.2% of
similar villages, for a net
decrease of 14.2%. This
suggests a high degree of
compliance with at least
Document No. 16's provision
prohibiting the introduction of
the Two-Field System.
As Figure 3 indicates,
farmers in the villages
currently employing the Twothat
Field System reported
is
land"5
responsibility

allocated by a variety of methods.
The survey responses also indicate that in the 17.6% of survey
villages in which the Two-Field System continues to exist, many villages
continue to designate a high proportion of village arable land as
responsibility land.
As indicated by Figure 4, 49.8% of villages currently employing the
Two-Field System have designated (in respondents' estimates) half or more
of village land as responsibility land.
Contracting of responsibility land to non-members of the collective
not
appear to be a significant issue. Nearly two-thirds (63.9%) of
does
farmers in villages currently employing the Two-Field System reported that
their villages do not contract any responsibility land to outsiders, while
21.8% reported that their village contracts a small amount of responsibility

Central Committee Document No. 16 further required that the Two-Field System end in any villages that
had adopted it without the voluntary agreement of village farmers. Id.
IS The Two-Field System breaks with the typical pattern of distributing all farmland on a per capita

basis. Instead, cultivated land is divided into two categories: consumption land and responsibility land.
Consumption land is distributed within each village on a per capita basis to meet each household's basic
needs. The remaining responsibility land is contracted to farmers through a variety of methods, which in
many cases results in a non-egalitarian land distribution. Unlike consumption land, on which farmers are
only responsible for collective contributions, an additional contracting fee is typically charged for
responsibility land. For an analysis of the Two-Field System and its implementation in China see Roy
Prosterman, Tim Hanstad, and Li Ping, Land Reform in China: The Two-Field System in Pingdu, RDI
Reports on Foreign Aid and Development #86 (November 1994) (Unpublished report on file with the Rural

Development Institute).
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Figure 4. Village Land Contracted as
Responsibility Land

Figure 5. Village Land Contracted as
Scale Farming Land

Small
Less Than

Amount

(<20%)
21.0%

Less than
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40%)
23.2%
__
43%
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land
(>75%)
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te
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Know

(<20%)

"::ii~iiii53.9%n=1

(>75%)
28.6%

(About
n=276

Half
of the Land
21.2%

n=l 14

land to outsiders, and only 2.0% reported that a large proportion of village
responsibility land is contracted to outsiders. 19
However, a further response to the survey may override to a

considerable extent discussion of the Two-Field System. For, of that
substantial majority of villages with responsibility land that have decided to
readjust prior to allocating land with 30-year land use rights, nearly three-

quarters of such villages (73.9%) are including responsibility land in that
readjustment, allocating it together with consumption land under 30-year
land use rights.
D.

Scale Fanning

The survey results indicate that Scale Farming 20 has only been
employed in a small minority of villages. Only 7.2% of farmers report that
their village currently employs Scale Farming on village arable land, with an
additional 2.7% reporting that their villages previously employed, but

19 An additional 12.2% of respondents did not know how much responsibility land was contracted to
non-members of the collective.
20 Scale Farming involves the consolidation of small labor-intensive farms into larger, mechanized
farms. Scale farming can be accomplished through a variety of approaches, but typically involves the
contracting of large areas of arable land to a limited number private farmers or the operation of large-scale
farms by the collective landowner. Recollectivization of farmland was the ultimate goal in at least some
experiments with Scale Farming that occurred in the early 1990's. For a discussion of Scale Farming and
its relevance to China see Roy Prosterman, Tim Hanstad, and Li Ping, Large-Scale Farmingin China:An
AppropriatePolicy? JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA, Vol. 28 No. 1 (1998) at 74.
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subsequently ended the practice of Scale Farming. The remaining 90.0% of
farmers reported that their village has never introduced Scale Farming.
In the villages that continue to employ Scale Farming, less than half
of village arable land is typically affected, as exhibited in Figure 5. Where
Scale Farming does exist, the survey results show that contracting of Scale
Farming land to non-members of the collective is much more common than
contracting of responsibility land to outsiders under the Two-Field System.
Flexible Land

E.

Flexible Land 21 is currently found in a much higher proportion of
villages than the Two-Field System or Scale Farming (see Figure 6). Almost
half of the villages that continue to
Figure 6. Villages Reserving Flexible
reserve Flexible Land have violated
Land
central policy by reserving more
village arable
of 22
percentLand.
five
than
Flexible
land as
Previously
Currntly
Reserved,

Reserves

But Ended

31.1%

12.5%

n=1606

Never

Reserved
56.4%

As Figure 7 indicates, 46.7%
of villages reserving Flexible Land
have violated central government
policy by reserving more than 5%
of arable land as Flexible Land, and
16.4% have reserved more than
10% of village arable land as
Flexible Land.
On the other hand, our
survey results indicate that the
implementation process itself has

Many villages in China have adopted the practice of reserving a small proportion of their arable
land from allocation to households on a per capita basis. This land, known as Flexible Land, is used to
provide land for new village households or for existing households that have added new members. It may
also be allocated as compensation for households who lose land through compulsory acquisition. Flexible
land is typically contracted on a compensated basis out for short-term use until needed for one of these
purposes.
Central Committe Document No. 16 called for villages to "strictly control and manage the
'Flexible Land."' See Central Committee Document No. 16, supra note 7. It required that "in those places
where 'Flexible Land' has been allocated, the total area of Flexible Land must be limited to the area of less
than five percent of the total land area, and such 'Flexible Land' must be used to solve the contradiction
between the limited land area and the large population. Id. Those areas of land in excess of the five
percent shall be contracted to households according to the principles of fairness and equality." Id.
21
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apparently not been the occasion
for widespread or substantial
increases in Flexible Land,
which would also be a violation
Of the
of central policy. 2 3
substantial majority of villages
with Flexible Land that have
decided to conduct a land
readjustment as part of the

Figure 7. Amount of Flexible Land
Reserved inVillages Currently Reserving
Flexible Land
6-10%
Reserved
30.3%

16-20%
Reserved
52
5.2%

21-30%
Reserved

30-year
process of implementing
land use rights, it appears that
fewer than one-fifth (18.7%)
have used that readjustment to

11-15%
Reserved
5.7%

R31%
'-Reserved
1-5%

1.8%

increase the amount of Flexible
533%
Land (60.7% of such villages
have not increased Flexible Land, and 20.7% of farmer respondents did not
know whether their village had increased Flexible Land). Where Flexible
Land has been increased in such a readjustment, it remains at 10% of village
arable land or less in about half the cases, and only rarely reflects a large
increase in the remaining cases.
Although contracting of Flexible Land to non-members of the
collective occurs, it does not appear to be a significant problem. The survey
results indicate that 65.6% of villages do not contract any Flexible Land to
outsiders, while 21.9% of respondents reported that their villages contract a
small amount of Flexible Land to outsiders, and only two percent reported
24
that their village contracts a large amount of Flexible Land to outsiders.
Farmers' Awareness and Support of the 30-Year No Readjustment
Policy

F.

The central government's publicity campaign concerning 30-year
rural land use rights has been extremely successful, as 92.4% of farmers
reported that they have heard of the 30-year no readjustment policy. More
farmers (60.7%) reported that they had heard of the policy from television
Central Committee Document No. 16 further stated that "in the places where no Flexible Land has
2
been retained at present, no Flexible Land should be allocated." Id. Combined with the 5% limit on total
Flexible Land, Central Committee Document No. 16 clearly prohibits villages from substantially increasing
Flexible Land area through the process of implementing 30-year land use rights. Id.
24

An additional 10.9% of farmers did not know whether their village contracts land to non-members

of the collective.

VOL. 9 No. 3

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

Figure 8. Attitudes Towards 30-Year
No Readjustment Poli y
Oppose
9.4%

Unclear
9.7%

\

F
1

lndifferent
11.

2%/

Support
69.7%

n-1563

than by any other means. A
relatively
high proportion of
farmers also reported that they had
heard of the policy through
discussion
by other villagers
(52.1%)
and through
formal
notification by cadres (51.5%).
As Figure 8 indicates, farmer
support for the 30-year no
readjustment policy is widespread.
The ratio of farmers approving of
the policy to farmers disapproving
is more than 7:1.

G.

The Implementation Process

1.

Development and Adoption ofImplementation Plans

As indicated by Table 2, farmers' responses indicate that 68.5% of
villages had started the implementation process as of August 1999.
However, only 60.3% of farmers reported that their villages had convened at
least one meeting at which the 30-year no readjustment policy was
discussed, leaving 8.2% of villages that had apparently started
implementation without convening such a meeting.
Table 2. The Process of Implementing 30-Year Land Use Rights
Has Your Village Reached the Following Stages
in the Process of Implementing 30-Year Rural Land Use Rights?
Stage
Frequency25
Yes
No

Don't
Know

Started the implementation process

1483

68.5%

31.5%

-

Convened at least one meeting to discuss

1485

60.3%

39.7%

-

1399
1431

47.8%
53.9%

52.2%
24.1%

21.9%

770
1444

63.0%
38.3%

37.0%
61.7%

implementation of 30-year rural land use rights
Adopted a village Implementation Plan
Decided to conduct a land readjustment (big or
small) as part of implementation of 30-year
rights
Completed a land readjustment
Issued 30-year land use right contracts to
farmers
25

Frequency represents the number of valid responses received for each survey question.
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In the villages where at least one meeting has been convened, the
survey results show that farmer attendance at such meetings is high. Only
11.5% of farmers in those villages responded that neither they nor a family
member had attended at least one meeting. In 62.7% of the responses, the
farmer respondent himself had attended one or more meetings, divided
between 27.3% who had attended one meeting and 35.4% who had attended
more than one meeting. In the remaining 25.7% of responses, a family
member other than the farmer respondent had attended one or more meetings
to discuss the 30-year no readjustment policy, divided between 9.2% where
another family member attended one meeting and 16.5% where another
family member had attended more than one such meeting.
Nearly half of all respondents (47.8%) reported that a village
implementation plan had been adopted at such a meeting, and such plans had
been adopted in 74.7% of villages where at least one meeting had been
convened to discuss the 30-year no readjustment policy. In just over half
(51.1%) of the villages in which implementation plans were adopted,
farmers reported that they had been adopted based on a vote, divided
between 22.2% who reported that the vote involved all village members, and
28.9% who reported that the vote involved all village representatives.
However, in one-third (33.7%) of the villages in which an implementation
plan was adopted, farmers reported that the cadres had adopted the plan
unilaterally without any vote. In the remaining cases, farmers reported that
they were unsure of how the implementation plans had been adopted
(10.4%), or that plans were adopted by methods other than those described
above (4.8%).
Where implementation plans were adopted based on a vote, the survey
results indicate that 29.8% of the time, unanimous approval of the voters
was required. Approval of more than two-thirds of all voters was required in
38.0% of the villages that voted, and a simple majority was required in
28.3%.26

26 An additional 3.0% of farmers reported that some voting requirement other than those described
here was used.
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Land Readjustments During the Process of Implementing 30-Year
Land Use Rights

Figure 9. Land Readjustments During the
Under Document No. 16, a final
Implementation Process
small readjustment prior to
implementation of 30-year rural
No
land rights may be conducted in
Small Readjustment
Readjustment
villages where population and
land contradictions exist, but big
readjustments are not permitted
as part of the implementation
process.27
Figure 9 shows
farmers' responses about whether
their village would conduct a land
Redutment
readjustment
during
the
Know
26.9%
implementation process.
n=143 1
Thus, more than half of
farmer respondents indicated that
their village had already conducted, or planned to conduct a land
readjustment as part of the process of implementing 30-year rural land use
rights. It should be noted that, despite Document No. 16, almost the same
proportion of villages have conducted or plan to conduct a big readjustment
prior to commencement of 30-year rights as have conducted or plan to
conduct a small readjustment.
Where their village has already decided to conduct a final
readjustment as part of the implementation process, 63.0% of farmers
reported that the land readjustment had already occurred, while 37.0%
reported that it had not yet occurred.

27 Central Committee Document No. 16 states: "When actually implementing the 30 years'
extension, the original land contracting for the great majority of farmers shall remain stable. The
implementation shall not take the approach by taking back all of the originally-contracted land and then recontract the land to farmers." See Central Committee Document No. 16, supra note 7.
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28
Issuance of 30-Year Land Use Contracts

Because Ar-ticle 14 of
the 1998 Land Management

Figure 10. Has the Collective Issued 30Year Land Use Contracts to Farmers?

Law requires the execution of
a land use contract between
Yes
the collective landowner and
38.3%
the farm household, full
implementation of 30-year
...........
land use rights cannot be
....
No
claimed until such contracts
61.7%
have physically been issued
The survey
to farmers.
n1444
results indicate that 48.5% of
farmers have signed a 30-year
land use contract, but that only 38.3% of farmers have been issued a 30-year
land use right contract (see Figure 10). This figure is substantially higher
than the percentages of farm households reporting issuance of a 30-year land
use contract during earlier rounds of fieldwork, and indicates that
approximately 75 million29 30-year land use contracts had been issued to
farm households in China by August 1999. At the same time, however, it
also indicates that over three-fifths of the villages in China (61.7%) had not
completed implementation of 30-year land use rights as of August 1999.
Where farmers reported that they had been issued a 30-year land use
contract and that they physically possessed a copy of the contract,
interviewers requested to observe the contract and recorded information
concerning the contract's provisions. Basic elements were present in 90% or
more of contracts, as shown in Table 3. However, it is nonetheless of

28 In addition to asking farmers whether they had been issued 30-year land use contracts,
interviewers also asked whether they had been issued 30-year Land Use Rights Certificates. Where
farmers had received such certificates, interviewers further asked farmers to produce them so that
interviewers could record key elements of the certificate's content on the survey questionnaire. The survey

results show substantial overlap between both contract and certificate content and contract and certificate
issuance. Further analysis is ongoing to determine actual issuance of certificates as distinct from contracts
and the content of such certificates.
29 We arrived at the figure of 75 million contracts issued by multiplying the percentage of farmers
who have received a contract (38.3%) by the approximate number of rural households in China (197
million; see supra note 14). This calculation assumes that results for the 94% of China's rural households

covered by the survey also hold for the remaining 6% of rural households not located in the 17 provinces.
The results of our 17 province survey should be accurate at the national level within +/- 2.4%. See supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
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concern that 8.1% of issued contracts did not specify the 30-year land use
term.
Table 3. Basic Information in Farmers' 30-Year Land Use Contracts
Does the Farmer's 30-Year Land Use Right Contract Include the Following
Basic Information?
Type of Information
Frequency
Yes
No
The 30-year land use term
500
91.9%
8.1%
The seal or signature of the issuing agency
505
99.3%
0.7%
The seal or signature of the contracting party
505
93.2%
6.8%
The total area of the contracted land
504
98.8%
1.2%

With respect to crucial provisions related to land readjustments during
the 30-year land use term, however, the observed contracts contained
important differences.
Table 4. Contract Provisions on Land Readjustments
Does the Farmer's 30-Year Land Use Right Contract Contain a Provision Concerning Land
Readjustments During the 30-Year Land Use Term?
Type of Provision
Frequency
Valid %
The contract allows land readjustments during
130
25.6%
the 30-year land use term

The contract requires land readjustments during
the 30-year land use term
The contract prohibits land readjustments during
the 30-year land use term
The contract contains no provisions concerning
land readjustments
The contract contains apparently inconsistent

20

3.9%

69

13.6%

218

42.9%

71

14.0%

508

100.0%

provisions concerning land readjustments

Total

Table 4 shows that 25.6% of the 30-year land use contracts that had
been issued to farmers contained provisions allowing land readjustments
during the 30-year land use term (and contained no other provisions
concerning land readjustments), and a further 3.9% of issued contracts
contained an illegal provision requiring land readjustments during the 30year land use term (and contained no other provisions concerning land
readjustments).
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As Table 5 shows, the observed contracts also contained important
differences related to farmers' ability to transfer their land use rights during
the 30-year land use term.30
Table 5. Contract Provisions on Land Use Right Transfers
Does the Farmer's 30-Year Land Use Right Contract Contain a Provision Concerning the
Transfer of 30-Year Land Use Rights?
Type of Provision
Frequency
Valid %
The contract allows transfers of 30-year
286
58.5%
land use rights
The contract prohibits transfers of 30-year
land use rights
The contract contains no provisions
concerning transfers of 30-year land use rights
The contract contains apparently inconsistent
provisions concerning land transfers

Total

H.

20

4.1%

161

32.9%

22

4.5%

489

100.0%

The Breadth of Farmers'Land Use Rights

With respect to land tenure security, breadth is a measure of the
quantity and quality of the land rights held. The survey contained a series of
questions related to farmers' perceptions of and attitudes towards the breadth
of their land use rights, including: (1) the right to transfer or lease their land
use rights to other villagers or non-members of the village collective; (2) the
right to pass their land use rights to their children by inheritance; (3) the
right to retain their land use rights upon change in household registration; (4)
the right to mortgage land use rights as security for credit; and (5) the right

30 Current Chinese Law allows the transfer of rural land use rights. See Land Management Law,
supra note 1,art. 2 ( "Land use rights may be transferred by law.").
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to sell their entire land use rights to others. Tables 6 and 7 summarize
farmers' responses to those questions.
Table 6. The Breadth of Farmers' Land Use Rights

Do Your Current Land Use Rights Include the Following Rights?
Type of Rights

Frequency

Yes

No

Transfer to another villager
Transfer to non-member of the village
collective
Pass to children through inheritance
Retain despite change in household

1473
1477

86.2%31
74.1%7

6.1%
15.3%

Don't
Know
7.7%
10.7%

1485
1480

58.8%
53.7%33

27.3%
38.8%

13.9%
7.5%

1421
1455

12.7%
27.5%

87.3%
52.8%

19.7%

II

registration

Mortgage land use rights
Right to transfer entire 30-year land use
right

Table 7. Farmers' Attitudes Towards The Breadth of Their Land Use Rights
Do You Think That Your Current Land Use Rights Should Include the Following Rights?
Frequency

Type of Rights

Yes

No

Don't

Transfer to another villager

1475

90.8%

4.1%

Know
5.0%

Transfer to non-member of the village
collective
Pass to children through inheritance
Retain despite change in household
registration
Mortgage land use rights
Right to transfer entire 30-year land use

1474

80.1%

11.4%

8.5%

1483
1483

64.2%
47.0%

25.1%
41.8%

10.8%
11.2%

1485
1454

29.5%
47.3%

49.5%
39.2%

21.0%
13.5%

right

I

3 1 This category includes responding farmers who believe that they possess the right to transfer their
land use rights to another villager subject to (1) registration of the transfer with the village committee, (2)
approval of the transfer with the village committee, or (3) no conditions whatsoever.
32 This category includes responding farmers who believe that they possess the right to transfer their
land use rights to outsiders subject to (i) registration of the transfer with the village committee, subject to
(2) aplroval of the transfer with the village committee, or (3) no conditions whatsoever.
This category includes farmers who believe they retain their land use rights upon change in
household registration status without changes in the terms of use, and farmers who believe they possess this
right subject to increased land contracting fees upon change in household registration status.
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Transfer or Lease of Land Use Rights to Other Villagers

The survey results indicate that 86.2% of farmers believe that they
possess the right to transfer or lease their land use rights to other villagers,
divided among 36.0% who believe they possess the right to transfer or lease
their land use rights without condition, 33.2% who believe they possess the
right to transfer or lease their land use rights on the condition that the
transfer be registered with the village committee, and 17.0% who believe
they possess such a right subject to approval by the village committee. Only
6.1% of farmers indicated that they did not have the right to transfer or lease
their land use rights under any circumstances. The remaining 7.7% did not
know whether they possessed the right to transfer or lease.
The overwhelming majority of farmers (90.8%) also responded that
they believed they should have the right to transfer or lease their land use
rights to other villagers. Only 4.1% of farmers believed they should not
have such a right. The remaining 5.0% did not know whether they should
have such a right.
2.

Transfer or Lease of Land Use Rights to Non-Members of the Village
Collective

Although fewer farmers believe that they possess the right to transfer
or lease their land use rights to non-members of the village collective than to
other villagers, nearly three-quarters (74.1%) of farmers responded that they
currently possess that right. Again, the farmers believing that they currently
possess such a right are divided among those who believe they have the right
to execute such a transfer or lease without condition (31.3%), those who
believe they possess such a right subject to registration with the village
committee (27.9%), and those who believe they possess such a right subject
to approval by the village committee (14.9%). Only 15.3% of farmers
believed that they did not possess the right to transfer or lease their land use
rights to outsiders. The remaining 10.7% of farmers did not know whether
they possess this right.
The majority of farmers (80.1%) again responded that they felt they
should possess the right to transfer or lease their land use rights to nonmembers of the village collective. Only 11.4% of farmers felt that they
should not possess such a right. The remaining 8.5% did not know whether
they should have such a right.
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InheritabilityofRural Land Use Rights

The survey results indicate that 58.8% of farmers believe that they
have the right to pass their land use rights to their children through
inheritance, while 27.3% of farmers do not believe that they possess this
right and 13.9% don't know whether they possess such a right. A slightly
higher percentage of farmers (64.2%) believe that their land use rights
should include the right to pass their land to their children by inheritance,
while 25.1% believe that rural land use rights should not be inheritable and
10.8% don't know.
4.

The Impact of Household Registration Changes on Rural Land Use
Rights

Contrary to previously observed practice in many rural areas of China,
over half of farmer respondents (53.7%) indicated that they believe they
Would retain their rural land use rights even where a family member changes
his household registration from rural to urban, divided between those who
believe that they would retain their rights without any changes in the
conditions of use (42.6%) and those who believed that they would retain the
rights subject to increased contracting fees (11.1%). Conversely, 38.8% of
farmers reported that the collective would revoke their land use rights upon
changes in household registration. The remaining 7.5% did not know what
would happen as a result of household registration changes.
When asked whether they believed they should possess the right to
retain rural land use rights upon household registration changes, 47.0%
indicated that they should possess this right, 41.8% responded that they
should not possess this right, and 11.2% did not know whether they should
possess this right.
5.

Mortgage ofRural Land Use Rights

Present law prohibits the mortgage of use rights to collectively-owned
arable land. Consistent with this prohibition, the vast majority of farmers
(87.3%) responded that they do not possess the right to mortgage their rural
land use rights, while only 12.3% responded that they possess this right. A
slightly higher percentage of farmers, but still a minority (29.5%) believed
that they should have this right, with 49.5% responding that they should not
possess such a right and 21.0% responding that they did not know whether
they should possess the right to mortgage their rural land use rights.
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Sale of Land Use Rights

In contrast to the high percentage of farmers believing that they
possess the right to transfer or lease their land use rights, only 27.5% of
farmers believe that they possess the right to sell the entirety of their land
use right. Over half of farmers (52.8%) responded that they did not possess
this right, with 19.7% responding that they do not know whether they
possess this right. When asked whether they should possess the right to sell
the entirety of their land use rights, nearly half of the farmers (47.3%)
responded favorably, with 39.2% responding negatively and 13.5%
indicating that they did not know whether they should possess such a right.
.

Farmers' Confidence in Their 30- Year Rural Land Use Rights

Farmers will only make long-term, productivity-enhancing
investments on their land if they have confidence that they will indeed
receive the full 30-year term of use free from readjustment.34 To determine
the extent of farmers' confidence in their ability to receive 30-year land use
rights without readjustment, the survey asked if farmers expected
readjustments to continue during the newly-introduced 30-year use term.
The survey results, as detailed in Table 8, indicate that only a minority of
farmers have confidence in their ability to receive 30-year land use rights
free from readjustment (hereinafter "farmers' confidence").

3 The need for long-term tenure security to make long-term investments in land is an underlying
premise of Article 14 of the Land Management Law and related policy documents.

See, e.g., Land

Management Law, supra note 1, art. 14. This premise has been amply demonstrated in RDI's Rapid Rural
Appraisal fieldwork over more than a decade, as well as in a 1,080 household survey conducted jointly by
RDI and the National Rural Experimental Zone Office of the Ministry of Agriculture in December 1996.
See Roy Prosterman et al., Can China Feed Itself., SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov. 1996, at 90; Roy
Prosterman et al., Prospects for Implementation of a No-Readjustment Policy in China, (August 1997)

(unpublished RDI memorandum on file with RDI). See also Tim Hanstad & Li Ping, Land Reform in the
People's Republic of China: Auctioning Rights to Wasteland, 19 LOYOLA L.A. INT. & COMP. L. J. 545

(1997) (reflecting the fact that Chinese farmers with long-term written contracts to wasteland, free of any
fear of readjustment, made substantial improvements and investments, while the same farmers did not
make such improvements or investments on their arable land, on which they did not have long-term land
use rights and were subject to readjustments).
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Table 8. Farmers' Expectations Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30Year Land Use Right Term According to Survey Responses
Do You Expect Land Readjustments to Continue During the 30-Year Land Use Term?
Response
There will definitely not be any more readjustments
Depends on the central government
(higher levels of government)
Readjustments will continue during the 30-year land use term
Depends on the cadres
Don't Know

Percentage of Farmers
Responding
12.7%
23.3%
35.2%
15.1%
13.8%
n=1449

The survey results indicate that only one out of eight farmers (12.7%)
presently expresses the highest degree of confidence, stating that there
"definitely will not be any more readjustments" during the 30-year land use
term.
For the purpose of further analyzing farmers' confidence, we have
also grouped the farmers that chose the four possibilities other than "don't
know" into two broader categories. The first category represents farmers
with a relatively high degree of confidence that their 30-year land use rights
will be free from future readjustment, and includes those farmers who
responded that there will definitely not be any future land readjustments and
those farmers responding that future land readjustments "depend on the
central government (higher levels of government)." The second category
represents those farmers with low confidence that their 30-year land use
rights will be free from future readjustments, and includes farmers
responding that "readjustments will continue during the 30-year land use
term" and that future land readjustments "depend on the cadres."
A number of factors support the grouping of four responses given by
farmers (other than "don't know") into the two broader categories described
above. First, it is clear that farmers responding that "there will definitely not
be any more readjustments" have the highest possible degree of confidence,
and farmers responding that "readjustments will continue" have the lowest
degree of confidence.
Second, during fieldwork prior to the conduct of the 1,621 household
survey, many farmers responded to our questions in a manner that indicated
a clear distinction between the central government and local cadres with
respect to attitudes towards the 30-year no readjustment policy. A number
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of farmers told us that "the central government's 30-year no readjustment
policy is good, but when policies get to lower levels, they are not
implemented," or "I support the 30-year no readjustment policy, but if the
cadres don't implement it, it doesn't mean anything." Such responses
indicate that farmers regard local cadres, and not the central government, as
the potential obstacle to receiving 30-year land use rights free from
readjustment.
Third, decisions to conduct land readjustments are made at the village
level, and not at higher levels of government, including the central
government. Farmers are certainly aware that land readjustment decisions
are made at the local level, as they can observe that their village's decisions
on whether or not to readjust land are made independently of neighboring
villages. Each of these factors supports the proposition that farmers who
respond that future readjustments "depend on the central government (higher
levels)" are expressing a higher degree of confidence that land readjustments
will not occur during the 30-year term than farmers who respond that future
readjustments "depend on local cadres."
Using these two groupings of confidence, with "don't know" as the
third category, 35 farmers' confidence in their ability to receive 30-year rural
land use rights free from readjustments is as shown in Table 9.
Table 9. Farmers' Expectations Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30Year Land Use Right Term According to High and Low Confidence Measures
Do You Expect Land Readjustments to Continue During the 30-Year Land Use Term?
Response
High Confidence in tenure security 6
Low Confidence in tenure security"
Don't Know

Percentage of Farmers
Responding
36.0%
50.2%
13.8%
n=1449

Even with this broader definition of higher-confidence farmers, only
36.0% of all farmers presently exhibit a degree of confidence that is at all
likely to lead to the making of long-term investments in the land.
35 It is important to include this category of farmers who are uncertain, since only the higherconfidence farmers as a proportion of the entire farming population (including the uncertain) can be
presently expected to engage in long-term investment behavior.
3 This category includes those farmers who responded that there will definitely not be any future
land readjustments and those farmers responding that future land readjustments "depend on the central
government (higher levels of government)."
37 This category includes those farmers responding that "readjustments will continue during the 30year land use term" and those farmers responding that future land readjustments "depend on the cadres."
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Examining this figure from a positive standpoint, as with our earlier
discussion of issuance of 30-year land use right contracts, this percentage
projects nationally to some 71 million farm households who may now have
sufficient confidence in their security of tenure to begin making long-term
investments on their land.38
However, more than in the earlier case (where the remedy for nonissuance of contracts may simply be to be aware of that fact and to bring
about the issuance of contracts), the remedy for the 64.0% of households
that are not presently in the higher confidence group may be complex. Such
a remedy may involve the presence or absence of various factors, some of
which may lend themselves to government intervention or alteration more
than others.
J.

FactorsHaving a Significant Impact on Farmers' Confidence

Much of our remaining analysis of the combined 17 province survey
results addresses the question of what specific and alterable factors appear to
be associated with farmers' confidence. To assess the relationship between
farmers' confidence and other factors addressed by the survey, we
completed a series of cross-tabulations. In these cross-tabulations, we
compared farmers' responses concerning confidence to their responses as to
the presence or absence of specific factors (e.g., whether or not a 30-year
land use contract had been issued to the respondent), which are covered in
the survey. The cross-tabulations indicate that the following eight factors
have a statistically significant impact on farmers' confidence.

38 The figure of 71 million rural households having a high degree of confidence that their 30-year
rural land use rights will not be subject to land readjustments during the 30-year land use term is arrived at
by multiplying the percentage of farmers expressing a high degree of confidence (36.0%) by the
approximate number of rural households in China (197 million; see supra note 14).

SEPTEMBER 2000

1.

CHINESE LAND REFORM

Farmers in the 18% of Survey Villages that had not Conducted any
Land Readjustments Since the Inception of the Household
Responsibility System Reported Much Higher Confidence than
Farmers in Villages that had Conducted One or More Land
Readjustments Under the HRS

Table 10. Farmers' Expectations Concerning Future Land Readjustments
in Villages that have not Conducted Land Readjustments Since the Inception of the
HRS Compared to Villages that have Conducted One or More Land Readjustments
Do You Expect Land Readjustments to Continue
During the 30-Year Land Use Term?
Has Village Ever Readjusted Land?
Farmers' Confidence
Yes
No
Don't
I
High Confidence in Tenure Security
Low Confidence in Tenure Security
Don't Know
Count

Pearson Chi-Square"°

Value
76.417

33.1%
55.1%
11.8%
1145
df
4

53.6%
25.9%
20.5%
239

Know
23.4%
51.6%
25.0%
64

Total
36.0%
50.1%
13.8%
1448

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided
.000

Because it relates to a fact of past behavior that is presently
unalterable, the correlation between absence of past land readjustments and
high farmer confidence does not lend itself directly to specific approaches
that could be developed to raise the overall confidence of Chinese farmers
during the current implementation process. However, by underlining the
link between absence of readjustments and farmers' sense of security on the
land they till, it does suggest certain actions that we explore in Part V.
Cross-tabulations further indicated that the factors discussed below
also had a statistically significant impact on farmers' confidence in their 30year land use rights.
Unlike the facts as to conduct of past land
readjustments, however, each of the remaining factors is presently alterable
in the course of the implementation process. In each case, there is either a
confidence-increasing factor that can be systematically replicated or
39 Any result with a significance level of less than or equal to .05 is statistically significant to the
95% confidence level. That is, the results are accurate in 95 out of 100 cases. Results with significance
levels of less than .05 are significant at levels even higher than the 95% confidence level. In the present
example, the .000 result is statistically significant to the 100% confidence level.
4 The Pearson-Chi Square measure for cross-tabulations tests the (null) hypothesis that the row and
column variables are independent, without indicating the strength or direction of the relationship. By
convention, the null hypothesis is rejected for two-sided significance levels of 0.05 or smaller.
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reinforced, or a confidence-reducing factor that can be systematically
eliminated or discouraged through specific actions designed to increase
farmers' land tenure security. The factors, and corresponding measures
designed to increase farmers' confidence in their 30-year land use rights, are.
discussed below:
2.

Farmers in Villages that Currently Employ the Two-Field System
Reported a Lower Degree of Confidence than Farmers in Villages
that Previously Employed, but Subsequently Ended the Two-Field
System, as Well as Farmersin Villages that Have Never Employed the
Two-Field System

Table 11. The Impact of the Two-Field System on Farmers' Expectations
Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30-Year Land Use Term
Do You Expect Land Readjustments to Continue
During the 30-Year Land Use Term?
Currently Employs
Previously
Never Employed the
Employed the
the
Two-Field System
Two-Field System
Two-Field System
High Confidence

in

34.3%

38.7%

36.0%

Tenure Security
Low Confidence
Tenure Security

in

58.1%

48.3%

48.3%

Don't Know

7.5%

13.0%

15.7%

Count

265

261

916
n=1442

Pearson Chi-Square

Value

df

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

15.021

4

.005

1

Nothing can be done, of course, to replicate the past fact of never
having employed the Two-Field System in villages that currently employ it.
However, it is possible to m6ve villages that currently employ the Two-Field
System into the category of villages that previously employed it, but no
longer do. Indeed, farmers whose village previously employed but
subsequently ended the practice of the Two-Field System have the highest
degree of confidence of any of the three groups.
We have already noted in Part III.C that 17.6% of villages still employ
the Two-Field System. We also found that nearly three-quarters of TwoField villages that decided to have a land readjustment during the process of
implementing 30-year land use rights have included, or plan to include,
responsibility land in that readjustment, allocating it together with
consumption land under 30-year rights.
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This trend towards ending the Two-Field System should be strongly
encouraged, since it will significantly impact farmers' confidence in their
30-year land use rights. This can be done in part through the national
publicity campaign on 30-year land use rights. It can also be aided by strict
enforcement of central government policy concerning the Two-Field
System, currently contained in Central Committee Document No. 16. That
is, villages that have never employed the Two-Field System should not be
allowed to implement it, and villages that implemented the Two-Field
System through administrative measures, and not in accordance with the
wishes of village farmers, should be required to end the practice.
3.

Farmers in Villages that had Issued 30-Year Land Use Right
Contracts Reported a Higher Level of Confidence in Their 30-Year
Rights than Farmersin Villages that had not Issued Contracts

Table 12. The Impact of Issuance of 30-Year Land Use Right Contracts on
Farmers' Expectations Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30-Year Term
Has Farmer's Village Issued 30-Year Land Use Right Contracts to Farmers?
No
Yes
31.7%
40.8%
High Confidence in Tenure Security
52.7%
47.9%
Low Confidence in Tenure Security
15.7%
11.3%
Don't Know
875
532
Count
n=1407
Asymp. SI . 2-sided
df
Value
.001
2
13.859
Pearson Chi-Square

This result sends a strong message that the central government should
continue to exert pressure on lower levels to implement 30-year land use
rights, and that implementation should not be considered complete until all
farmers have been physically issued a 30-year land use right contract. An
important step towards ensuring that full implementation has occurred, and
that all farmers have in fact received a 30-year land use contract, would be
for the central government to require every county-level government to
conduct very simple targeted monitoring interviews to ascertain how many
administrative villages within the county have actually issued such contracts.
A detailed description of a proposed monitoring program for contract
issuance is provided in Part V.
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4.

Where Contracts had been Issued, the Presence of a Contract
Provision Allowing Land Readjustments During the 30-Year Land
Use Term Nullified the IncreasedConfidence Resultingfrom Contract
Issuance

As described above, when a farmer reported that he possessed a 30year land use right contract, the interviewer requested that the farmer
produce a copy of the contract so that the interviewer could record
information concerning the contract's key provisions on the survey
questionnaire.

Table 13 illustrates the dramatic negative impact of a

provision allowing land readjustments during the 30-year land use term on
farmers' confidence in their 30-year rights, relative to farmers whose
contract does not contain such a provision.
Table 13. The Impact of a Contract Provision Allowing Land Readjustments on
Farmers' Expectations Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30-Year Term
(Three Response Categories)
Does Farmer's Land Use Contract Contain a Provision Allowing Land Readjustments
During the 30-Year Land Use Term?
No
48.8%
39.7%
11.5%
209

High Confidence in Tenure Security
Low Confidence in Tenure Security
Don't Know
Count

Pearson Chi-Square

Value
19.736

df
2

Yes
25.2%
63.4%
11.4%
123
n=33241

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.000

One quarter of issued contracts (25.6%) contain such a provision
allowing readjustments, so this issue looms as a grave threat to successful

implementation of the central government's policy of giving 30-year land
use rights to farmers.42
As Table 14 shows, the results of this cross-tabulation are even more

dramatic when expressed in terms of the five possible responses given by
farmers.
41 "n" in this case differs from that in Table 4 (where 218 + 130 = 348); there are 16 cases of missing
values for the variable on confidence in tenure security. Of these 16 cases, 7 cases had land use contracts
with a provision allowing land readjustments during the 30-year term and 9 cases had no such provision.
42 As shown in Table 4, an additional 3.9% of issued contracts contain a provision requiring
readjustments. Another 14.0% contain apparently inconsistent provisions concerning readjustments.
Altogether then, 43.5% of issued contracts contain some kind of readjustment provision, which is likely to
be either unsettling or confusing to the farmer.
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Table 14: The Impact of a Contract Provision Allowing Land Readjustments on
Farmers' Expectations Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30-Year Term
(Five Response Categories)
Does Farmer's Land Use Contract Contain a Provision Allowing Land Readjustments
During the 30-Year Land Use Term?
Yes
No
7.3%
17.2%
readjustments
more
be
any
There will definitely not
17.9%
31.6%
Depends on the central government
(higher levels of government)
55.3%
28.7%
Readjustments will continue during the 30-year land use term
8.1%
11.0%
Depends on the cadres
11.4%
11.5%
Don't Know
n=332
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
df
Value
.000
4
25.915
Pearson Chi-Square

The most striking feature of Table 14 is the dramatic increase in the
proportion of farmers (from 28.7% where the contract does not contain a
provision allowing readjustment to 55.3% where the contract does contain
such a provision) offering the lowest-confidence responses that
"readjustments will continue," an indication that they have no confidence in
their ability to enjoy 30-year land use rights free from readjustment.
It is further important to note that the confidence level among farmers
possessing a contract containing a provision permitting land readjustments
during the 30-year land use term was not only lower than farmers who
possessed such a contract without a provision concerning land
readjustments, but was also lower even than for farmers who had not been
issued a land use contract at all. This can readily be seen by comparing the
"Yes" column of Table 13 (contract issued, but contains a provision
allowing land readjustments) with the "No" column of Table 12 (contract
not even issued).
There are several possible explanations for the correlation between the
existence of a contract provision permitting land readjustments and
extremely low confidence among farmers. The most logical explanation is
that farmers have read the provisions of their land use contract and, based on
the existence of such a provision, reached the conclusion that land
readjustments will indeed continue during the 30-year term. Because the
existence or absence of specific contract provisions was recorded by the
interviewers, and interviewers did not independently ask farmers whether
they were aware of the content of their contracts with respect to land
readjustments, it is not possible to either affirm or reject this conclusion.
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A second possible explanation is that cadres who view readjustments
as reinforcing their powers or perquisites make a special point of informing
farmers that a provision allowing land readjustments is present in the
contract. A third possible explanation that also supports the correlation
between the existence of a provision permitting land readjustments during
the 30-year use term and low confidence among farmers is that cadres have
communicated to farmers that readjustments will be permitted during the 30year term through other means, such as announcement at a village meeting.
Further analysis of the survey results is ongoing to determine if we have
sufficient information to determine whether either of these additional
possible explanations is indeed the case.
The results of this cross-tabulation indicate that where
"implementation" of 30-year land use rights includes the issuance of a
contract containing a provision permitting land readjustments during the 30year land use term, such "implementation" may be doing more to threaten
farmers' confidence than to increase it.43 This finding further supports the
need for drafting of a standardized national 30-year land use contract, as
well as the need to either eliminate all land readjustments during the 30-year
use term, or else to explicitly limit the scope of such readjustments and the
land to which they can apply. These issues are discussed in detail in Part V.
5.

The Survey Results Indicate that Farmers' Confidence was Much
Lower in Villages that had Adopted the Measure of Conducting Land
Readjustments During the 30-Year Term as a Means of Resolving
Land and Population Contradictions than in Villages that had not
Adopted Such a Measure

Apart from the contents of any issued contracts, where farmers
reported that their village would conduct a land readjustment during the
process of implementing 30-year rural land use rights, we asked whether the
village had also adopted certain additional measures designed to resolve
population and land contradictions during the 30-year land use term. One
such measure was the conduct of small readjustments during the 30-year
land use term. Table 15 indicates the effect of adopting such a measure on
farmers' confidence.
43 Further cross-tabulations not included in the present report indicate that issuance of a contract
permitting land readjustments during the 30-year land use term is also associated with the loss of most or
all of the increased confidence that otherwise comes when farmers believe that their land use rights are
inheritable or believe that such rights are retained despite changes in household registration. For the effect
of the two latter beliefs on farmers' confidence, see subsections 6 and 7.
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Table 15. The Impact of Village Adoption of a Measure to Conduct Small Land
Readjustments During the 30-Year Land Use Term on Farmers' Expectations
Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30-Year Land Use Term
Did Your Village Adopt a Measure to Conduct Small Land Readjustments
During the 30-Year Land Use Term?

No
There will definitely not be more readjustments
Depends on the central government

Yes

19.7%
24.%

6.0%
19.7%

43.9%
10.6%
1.5%
66

54.6%
9.6%
10.0%
249

(higher levels of government)

Readjustments will continue during the 30-year land use term
Depends on the cadres
Don't Know
Count

n=315

I
Pearson Chi-Sguare

ISrValue
117.180

df

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

4

.002

In addition, we asked whether the measure of big readjustments
during the 30-year land use term had been adopted. The results show that
the adoption of a measure to conduct big readjustments leads to substantial
and progressive further loss of confidence by farmers compared to the
situation where a measure for continuing small readjustments has been
adopted. This loss of confidence can be seen by comparing the already low
confidence levels shown in the "Yes" column in Table 15 to the even lower
confidence levels shown in the "Yes" column of Table 16.

4
This column represents those villages where the village has neither adopted a measure to conduct
small land readjustments during the 30-year land use term nor a measure to conduct big readjustments
during the 30-year land use term.
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Table 16. The Impact of Village Adoption of a Measure to Conduct Big Land
Readjustments During the 30-Year Land Use Term on Farmers' Expectations
Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30-Year Land Use Term
Did Your Village Adopt a Measure to Conduct Big Land Readjustments
During the 30-Year Land Use Term?
___-

There will definitely not be more readjustments
Depends on the central government
(higher levels of government)
Readjustments will continue during the 30-year land use term
Depends on the cadres
Don't Know
Count

Pearson Chi-Square

Value
16.947

df
4

1

Yes 4

8.9%
20.9%

2.3%
6.8%

52.2%
9.8%
8.2%
316

59.1%
27.3%
4.5%
44
n=360

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.002

Current law and policy statements clearly prohibit the conduct of big

readjustments during the 30-year land use term.47 These survey results are
consistent with the goals of existing legal rules, and strongly reinforce the
argument that such big readjustments have a serious negative impact on
farmers' confidence.
As to adoption of measures for continuing small readjustments during
the 30-year land use term, means to prevent the adoption of such measures
are discussed in Part V.

45 This column includes both villages that have neither adopted a measure to conduct small
readjustments during the 30-year term nor a measure to conduct big readjustments during that term ("No"
column from Table 15) and those villages that have adopted only a measure to conduct small readjustments
during the 30-year term ("Yes" column from Table 15). As noted in the text, the progressive further loss of
confidence when a measure for conducting big readjustments has been adopted can best be seen by
comparing the "Yes" column alone from Table 15 with the "Yes" column in the present Table 16.
46 Because the adoption of a measure to conduct big readjustments during the 30-year land use term
does not necessarily exclude the possibility of the adoption of a measure to conduct small readjustments
during the 30-year term, this column contains both those cases where farmers replied that only the measure
of big readjustments during the 30-year term had been adopted and those cases where farmers responded
that the measure of small readjustments during the 30-year term had been adopted in addition to the
measure of big readjustments during the 30-year term.
47 Central Committee Document No. 16 also prohibits the conduct of big readjustments as part of the
process of implementing 30-year rural land use rights. See Central Committee Document No. 16, supra
note 7. However, the survey results show that approximately half of the villages conducting a land
readjustment during the implementation process have conducted or plan to conduct a big readjustment, and
that such readjustments, unlike the agreement to conduct big readjustments during the 30-year land use
term, have not had a significant negative impact of farmers' confidence.
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6.

Farmers Who Believed that Their Current Land Use Rights Include
the Right to Pass on Their Land to their Children by Inheritance
Reported a Higher Degree of Confidence in Their Ability to Receive
the Full 30-Year Land Use Term Free from Readjustment than
Farmers Who did not Believe that Their Land Use Rights Included
this InheritanceRight

Table 17. The Impact of Farmers' Belief in Inheritance Rights on Farmers'
Expectations Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30-Year Land Use Term
Do Your Current Land Use Rights Include the Right to Pass on
Your Land Use Rights to Your Children Through Inheritance?
Don't Know
No
Yes
23.0%

High Confidence in Tenure Security

45.2%

22.9%

Low Confidence in Tenure Security

41.8%

66.0%

54.4%

Don't Know

13.0%

11.1%

22.5%

849

397

204

Count

n=1450
Value

earson Chi-Square

194.694

df

4 1

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

.000

Current law and policy neither explicitly affirms nor rejects farmers'
right to pass their land use rights to children through inheritance. The
central government should clearly affirm this right in forthcoming legislation
governing rural land use rights, and inform farmers that they possess this
right through a national publicity campaign.
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Farmers Who Believed that Their Current Land Use Rights Include
the Right to Retain Their Land Use Rights Upon Change in
Household Registration Also Reported a Higher Degree of
Confidence than Farmers Who did not Believe Their Current Land
Use Rights Included Such a Right

Table 18. The Impact of Farmers' Belief in the Right to Retain Their Land Use
Rights Upon Household Registration Status Changes on Farmers' Expectations
Concerning Land Readjustments During the 30-Year Land Use Term
Do Your Current Land Use Rights Include the Right to Retain
Your Land Use Rights Upon Changes in Household Registration Status?
No
Yes
Yes, with Increased
contract fees
25.1%
33.1%
48.4%
High Confidence in Tenure Security
59.6%
59.4%
40.6%
Low Confidence in Tenure Security
15.2%
7.5%
11.0%
Don't Know
565
160
609
Count
Pearson Chi-Square

Value

df

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

101.858

6

.000

Don't
Know
27.9%
42.3%
29.7%
111
n=1445

Current law and policy are silent on the issue of whether farmers
retain their 30-year land use rights upon changes in household registration.
The central government should clearly affirm this right in forthcoming
legislation governing rural land use rights, and inform farmers that they
possess this right through a national publicity campaign (see Table 18).

SEPTEMBER 2000

8.

CHINESE LAND REFORM

Farmers Who Believed that Their Current Land Use Rights Included
the Right to Transfer or Lease Their Land, Whether to Other Villagers
or to Outsiders, Reported Lower Confidence in Their Land Tenure
Security than Both Farmers Who did not Believe they had the Right to
Transfer Their Land and Farmers that did not Know Whether they
had Such a Right.

Table 19. The Impact of Farmers' Belief in the Right to Transfer or Lease Their 30Year Land Use Rights on Farmers' Expectations Concerning Land Readjustments
During the 30-Year Land Use Term
Do Your Current Land Use Rights Include the Right to Transfer or Lease Your 30-Year
Land Use Rights?

High Confidence in
Tenure Security
Low Confidence in

Tenure Security

Yes, no
registration
or approval

Yes, but must
register
transfer

Yes, but must
obtain
approval

No

Don't
Know

32.2%

35.5%

41.6%

38.8%

37.4%

53.7%

54.3%

45.8%

47.0%

39.4%

14.1%
540

10.2%
480

12.6%
241

14.2
88

23.2%
111

I

Don't Know
Count

Pearson Chi-Square

Value

df

Asymp. SIg. (2-sided)

41.109

8

.000

In a setting where land transfers are conducted on a voluntary basis, it
is unexpected that the existence of transfer rights would lead to lower
perception of land tenure security among farmers. Our previous fieldwork
in China indicates that short-term (mostly seasonal or annual) land transfers
have begun to occur in parts of China, and that most transfers seem to be
accomplished on a voluntary, rather than compulsory, basis. Given the fact
that Chinese law currently recognizes farmers' right to transfer their rural
land use rights,4 8 and over 80% of farmers in the survey reported that their
current land use right includes the right to transfer their land with or without
condition, the finding that the existence of rights to transfer actually
decreases farmers' sense of land tenure security is surprising. Analysis of
the survey results is ongoing to determine whether any additional factors can
be identified that would contribute to such a correlation.

4
See Land Management Law, supra note 1, art. 2.
transferred by law."

Article 2 states that "the land use right may be
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There are, however, several historical factors not directly addressed
by our survey that may cause concern among farmers with respect to land
transfer rights. First, many farmers retain feelings that collectively-owned
land should be allocated at least somewhat equally among village
households. It is possible that farmers correlate the right to transfer land use'
rights with the consolidation of large landholdings in the hands of a small
number of village households, or at least with the development of less
egalitarian landholdings within the village. It is also possible that the strong
historical bias against absentee landlords on rural land causes rural residents
to worry that farmers, if given the right to transfer their land to non-members
of the collective economic unit, will transfer their rights to richer urban
dwellers, thereby losing their access to the land.
These potential concerns, or other factors yet to be discovered from
analysis of the survey results, that point to a negative correlation between the
existence of land transfer rights and lower land tenure security among
farmers should not be ignored. However, a number of important points
bearing on this issue strongly suggest that the best method of addressing
such a correlation lies not in restricting or taking away farmers' right to
transfer their rural land use rights, but rather in protecting and further
defining that right. First, China's current distribution of rural land rights is
the most egalitarian distribution of any country in the world. The only
method of maintaining such an egalitarian land distribution is frequent land
readjustments, which exact an enormous cost in terms of farmers' land
tenure security and agricultural productivity. It is an inevitable fact, widely
accepted among Chinese agricultural scholars and policymakers, that the
development of China's agricultural sector will result in increased rural to
urban migration, and consolidation of land use rights in the hands of a
smaller number of farmers cultivating larger, and unequal landholdings. The
most efficient means of facilitating this development is through voluntary
transfers of rural land use rights. This is a process that has occurred, over a
period of time, in all developed market economies.
Second, current law, embodied in Article 2 of the Land Management
Law, has already established farmers' rights to transfer their land use rights.
Third, the vast majority of farmers in the survey expressed a belief that their
current land use rights include the right to transfer their land use rights,
whether on condition of approval or registration or free from any conditions.
This includes 74.1% of farmers who responded that they believe they
currently have the right to transfer their land use rights to outsiders, whether
subject to condition of approval or registration or free from any conditions.
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Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, most farmers believe that they
should possess such transfer rights. In fact, 90.8% of farmers believe they
should have the right to transfer their land use rights to other villagers, and
80.1% believe that they should have the right to transfer their land use rights
to outsiders. These percentages are actually higher than the percentages of
farmers responding that they currently possess such rights (86.2% and
74.1%, respectively).
Clearly, whatever factors are leading farmers to correlate transfer
rights with lower land tenure security, this correlation is not caused by any
lack of desire for such rights. More likely, it is due to the fact that they are
uncertain as to the scope of such rights. Indeed, current law concerning
transfers of rural land use rights does nothing more than mention that such
rights exist. Therefore, the most effective means of addressing farmers'
concerns with respect to land use transfer rights and increase farmers' land
tenure security will be for the central government to clearly define the scope
of the rights in forthcoming legislation.4 9
IV. PROVINCE LEVEL SURVEY RESULTS

This part contains an analysis of the survey results on an individual
province basis from the approximately 100 households in each of 17
provinces as part of the national survey comprising 1,621 interviews. The
results indicate that wide variations exist among the 17 provinces in which
the survey was conducted, with respect to major elements of implementation
of 30-year rural land use rights and farmers' land tenure security. °

49 Definitional issues include such matters as transferability within or outside the village, with
or
without approval. Additional issues as to protection might be considered in such legislation, such as
possible interim limits on maximum sizes of landholdings.
50 The 17 survey provinces chosen contain approximately 94% of China's total rural population. See
discussion supra, Part II. The goal was to carry out 100 random interviews of farmers in 100 villages in
each of these provinces. In practice, the number of valid survey responses ranged from 69 to 103. A
sample size of 100 farmers should yield results that are accurate within +/- 9.8% in 95 cases out of 100.
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PreviousLand Readjustments

As Table 20 shows, there were only three provinces out of the 17 in
which only a minority of farmer respondents reported that their village had
conducted one or more
Table 20. Previous Land Readjustments by
readjustments
land
Province
since the inception of
The lowest
HRS.
Has Village Conducted Land
Readjustments Since the Inception of
Province
percentages of farmers
the Household Responsibility System?
reporting at least one
Don't Know
No
Yes
previous readjustment
0.0%
8.1%
91.9%
Hebei
were found in Guangxi
3.0%
7.0%
90.0%
Jilin
1.1%
16.8%
82.1%
Heilongiiang
and Guizhou, where
1.0%
21.6%
77.5%
Jiangsu
only 28.4% and 28.6%,
6.4%
3.8%
89.7%
Anhui
respectively, of farmer
3.0%
11.0%
86.0%
Shandong
respondents reported at
0.0%
27.8%'
72.2%
Zhejiang
least one previous
1.0%
6.9%
92.1%
Jiangxi
1.0%
22.3%
76.7%
Fujian
In the
readjustment.
6.1%
13.1%
80.8%
Hunan
third such province,
7.1%
30.6%
62.2%
Hubei
of
Yunnan, 43.5%
10.7%
1.0%
88.3%
Henan
respondents
farmer
12.7%
58.8%
28.4%
Guangxi
reported at least one
6.6%
64.8%
28.6%
Guizhou
2.0%
9.1%
88.9%
Sichuan
previous land readjust10.1%
46.4%
43.5%
Yunnan
ment. By contrast, at
4.8%
8.7%
86.5%
Shaanxi
least 90% of farmer
respondents in Hebei (91.9%), Jilin (90.0%), and Jiangxi (92.1%), reported
that their village had conducted at least one readjustment since the inception

of the Household Responsibility System.
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The Two-Field System

Table 21 shows that the percentage of villages currently employing
the Two-Field System varies widely among the 17 provinces in our survey.
In eight provinces (Heilongjiang, Anhui, Fujian, Hunan, Henan, Guizhou,
Sichuan, and Yunnan),
Table 21. Employment of the Two-Field System by
fewer than 10% of
Province
farmers reported that
the Two-Field System
Has Village Employed the
Province
Two-Field System?
is currently employed
Currently
Employed
Never
in their villages. The
Employs
But Ended
Employed
highest incidence of
Hebei
40.7%
20.9%
38.4%
current employment of
Jilin
30.0%
36.0%
34.0%
Heilongiiang
9.5%
the Two-Field System
18.9%
71.6%
Jiangsu
33.7%
22.8%
43.6%
was found in Shaanxi,
Anhui
7.7%
15.4%
76.9%
with 45.2% of farmers
Shandong
31.3%
29.3%
39.4%
reporting that the TwoZhejiang
17.8%
6.7%
75.6%
Field
System
is
Jiangxi
16.8%
33.7%
49.5%
Fujian
1.0%
30.1%
68.9%
currently
employed.
Hunan
0.0%
1.0%
99.0%
Other provinces in
Hubei
10.2%
5.1%
84.7%
which a relatively high
Henan
7.8%
18.6%
73.5%
percentage of villages
Guangxi
31.4%
3.9%
64.7%
Guizhou
7.7%
currently employ the
0.0%
92.3%
Sichuan
5.1%
22.2%
72.7%
Two-Field
System
Yunnan
4.3%
7.2%
88.4%
include Hebei (40.7%),
Shaanxi
45.2%
22.1%
32.7%
Jiangsu
(33.7%),
Guangxi (31.4%), Shandong (31.3%), and Jilin (30.0%).
C.

Scale Farming

The province level results indicate that the incidence of ScaleFarming is uniformly low, with only four provinces having over 10% of
farmer respondents report that their villages currently employs Scale
Farming-Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, and Hebei.
Of these four
provinces, the percentage of farmers reporting that their village currently
employs Scale Farming was nearly twice as high in Zhejiang (31.1%) as in
the next highest province, Jiangsu (15.7%).

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

D.

VOL. 9 No. 3

Flexible Land

The percentage of farmers reporting that their village currently
reserves some arable land as Flexible Land varies greatly by province. The
highest percentage was
Table 22. Flexible Land by Province
found in Heilongjiang,
where 83.0% of farmers
Has Village Reserved Flexible Land?
Never
Previously
Currently
Province
reported that their village
Reserved
Reserved
Reserves
reserves some arable land
45.3%
10.5%
44.2%
Hebei
as Flexible Land. Other
16.0%
15.0%
69.0%
Jilin
provinces in which at least
8.5%
8.5%
83.0%
Heilongiiang
50% of farmers reported
58.4%
15.8%
25.7%
Jiangsu
66.7%
15.4%
17.9%
Anhui
that their village currently
30.0%
4.0%
66.0%
Shandong
reserves Flexible Land
51.1%
6.7%
42.2%
Zhejiang
(69.0%),
Jilin
include
50.5%
28.7%
20.8%
Jiangxi
and
(66.0%),
Shandong
80.2%
10.9%
8.9%
Fujian
76.5%
5.1%
18.4%
Hunan
By
(51.0%).
Shaanxi
82.6%
1.1%
16.3%
Hubei
contrast, a low percentage
49.5%
17.5%
33.0%
Henan
of farmers reported that
76.8%
12.1%
11.1%
Guangxi
currently
village
their
76.7%
8.9%
14.4%
Guizhou
Sichuan
Yunnan
Shaanxi

E.

10.1%
23.2%
51.0%

18.2%
23.2%
15.7%

71.7%
53.6%
33.3%

reserves Flexible Land in
Guangxi (11.1%), Sichuan
(10.1%), and Fujian (8.9%).

Farmers' Awareness and Support of the 30-Year No Readjustment
Policy

The percentage of farmers reporting that they have heard of the 30year no readjustment policy was universally high. The proportion of farmers
who report that they had heard of the 30-year no readjustment policy fell
below 90% in only two provinces, Henan (72.4%) and Yunnan (79.4%).
Support for the policy was also strong across provinces. In 13 of the
17 provinces, at least 64.1% of farmers responded that they support the 30year no readjustment policy. Support for the policy was especially strong in
Shandong (87.8%), Jilin (86.6%), and Heilongjiang (85.4%). At the same
time, direct opposition to the policy was low, with over 15% of farmers
opposing in only Fujian (20.6%) and Guangxi (17.0%). In nine provinces,
under 10% of farmers expressed opposition. The ratio of support to
opposition fell below 3:1 in only one province, and was 5:1 or higher in 14
of the 17 provinces.
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Implementation of 30-Year Rural Land Use Rights

With respect to whether they have started the process of implementing
30-year rural land use rights, the 17 provinces can be divided into two
categories. In 10 provinces, at least two-thirds of farmer respondents
reported that their village has started the implementation process. Of these
provinces, the highest percentages of farmers reporting that implementation
had begun in their villages by August 1999 were found in Guizhou (97.6%)
and Heilongjiang (92.6%).
In the remaining seven provinces, fewer than two-thirds of farmers
reported that implementation has begun. In four of these provinces,
implementation was particularly slow, with 50% or fewer of farmers
reporting that that their villages had started. These provinces are Hunan
(47.9%), Shandong (44.6%), Hebei (43.2%), and Zhejiang (41.4%).
G.

30-Year Rural Land Use Right Contracts

1.

Signing of 30-Year Contracts

Over 50% of farmers reported having signed a 30-year rural land use
right contract in eight of the 17 survey provinces, while 50% or fewer of
farmers reported signing a 30-year land use right contract in the remaining
nine provinces. The provinces with the highest proportion of farmers
reporting that they had signed a contract included Yunnan (75.6%), Guizhou
The provinces with the lowest
(75.0%), and Heilongjiang (70.5%).
proportion of farmers reporting that they had signed a contract were
Zhejiang (17.2%) and Hunan (15.5%), which were also two of the four
lowest provinces in terms of farmers reporting that implementation had even
begun.
2.

Issuance of30- Year Contracts

In contrast to the findings related to signing of 30-year rural land use
contracts, the survey results indicate that over 50% of farmers reported that
they had been issued a 30-year rural land use contract in only four of the 17
provinces (Yunnan, Guizhou, Jiangxi, and Jilin), while 50% or fewer of
farmers reported that they had been issued such a contract in 13 of the 17
provinces. The provinces in which the lowest percentages of farmers
reported that they had been issued a 30-year contract were again Zhejiang
(12.2%) and Hunan (9.9%).
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ContractsIssued as a Proportionof ContractsSigned

By dividing the number of contracts that farmers reported as issued in
each province by the number of contracts that farmers reported signed, it is
possible to determine the percentage of contracts issued as a proportion of
contracts signed in each of the 17 survey provinces. Such an analysis
indicates that, as of August 1999, six provinces (Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui,
Hunan, Heilongiiang, and Guangxi), had only issued contracts to farmers in
two-thirds or fewer of the cases in which the farmer reported signing a
contract. Most notable of these provinces was Guangxi, in which contracts
were only issued in 47.8% of the cases in which farmers reported signing a
contract.
By contrast, in eight provinces, contracts had been issued in at least
80% of the cases in which farmers reported having signed a contract. The
provinces with the highest proportion of contracts issued relative to contracts
signed were Jiangxi (98.3%), Shaanxi (95.7%), and Yunnan (91.2%).
Table 23. Signing and Issuance of 30-Year Land Use Contracts by Province
Percentage of Farmers Contracts Issued as
Percentage of Farmers
a Proportion of
Reporting that 30-Year Reporting that 30-Year
Contracts Signed
Contract Issued
Contract Signed
70.6%
32.4%
43.6%
Hebei
87.5%
57.7%
66.0%
Jilin
61.1%
44.1%
70.5%
Heilongiiang
66.1%
44.1%
66.7%
Jiangsu
66.0%
43.7%
61.0%
Anhui
79.0%
37.4%
46.7%
Shandong
66.7%
12.2%
17.2%
Zhejiang
98.3%
58.2%
59.2%
Jiangxi
104.8%*
43.4%
40.6%
Fujian
63.6%
9.9%
15.5%
Hunan
80.0%
36.4%
43.5%
Hubei
85.0%
34.7%
39.6%
Henan
47.8%
23.7%
49.5%
Guangxi
80.9%
60.7%
75.0%
Guizhou
80.8%
42.7%
52.8%
Sichuan
91.2%
68.9%
75.6%
Yunnan
95.7%
45.9%
47.0%
Shaanxi
* It is both a legal and logical requirement that 30-year land use contracts be signed by farmers
before they are issued. The survey results from Fujian Province, however, indicate that farmers
reported a higher number of contracts having been issued than had been signed. Additional
analysis of these results is ongoing to determine the reason for this seemingly contradictory
result.
Province
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Table 23 shows the percentage of villages in each province in which
farmers reported signing a 30-year contract, the percentage of villages in
each province in which farmers reported that contracts had been physically
issued to farmers, and the contracts issued as a proportion of contracts
signed in each province.
Farmers' Confidence in Their 30-Year Rural Land Use Rights

H.

Table 24. Farmers' Confidence in Their 30-Year Rural Land Use Rights by
Province
Province
Hebei

Do You Expect Land Readjustments to Continue
During the 30-Year Term?
Don't Know
Low Degree
High Degree
of Confidence
of Confidence
9.5%
51.4%
39.0%

Jilin
Heilongiiang
Jiangsu

40.0%
38.9%
33.3%

40.0%
52.8%
62.3%

20.0%
8.3%
4.2%

Anhui
Shandong
Zhejiang
Jiangxi
Fujian
Hunan
Hubei
Henan
Guangxi
Guizhou
Sichuan
Yunnan
Shaanxi

53.7%
18.3%
47.7%
31.7%
51.0%
24.1%
32.5%
22.5%59.7%
70.2%
26.8%
48.8%
33.3%

29.2%
75.3%
38.6%
51.7%
27.7%
64.4%
50.0%
63.8%
17.9%
15.8%
50.9%
30.2%
61.4%

16.9%
6.3%
13.6%
16.7%
21.3%
11.4%
17.5%
13.5%
22.4%
14.0%
22.2%
20.9%
5.2%

As Table 24 indicates, the percentage of farmers reporting that they
51
had a high degree of confidence in their 30-year land use rights varied
widely by province, from only 18.3% of farmers in Shandong to 70.2% of
farmers in Guizhou. The percentage of farmers reporting a low degree of
confidence in their 30-year land use rights 52 also varied substantially, with

51 This category includes those farmers who responded that there will definitely not be any future
land readjustments and those farmers responding that future land readjustments "depend on the central
government (higher levels of government)."
532 This category includes those farmers responding that "readjustments will continue during the 30year land use term" and those farmers responding that future land readjustments "depend on the cadres."
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Shandong (75.3%) and Guizhou (15.8%) again representing the two
extremes.
I.

Farmers'Rightto Transfer or Lease Their Land Use Rights

As possible responses to the question "Do your current land use rights
contain the right to transfer or lease your land to another villager?," farmers
were given the following five options: (1) Yes, but I must register the
transfer or lease with the village committee; (2) Yes, but I must obtain
approval of the transfer or lease by the village committee; (3) I do not have
the right to transfer or lease my land use rights to another villager; (4) Don't
know; and (5) I have the right to transfer or lease my land use rights to
another village without condition. Adding together the farmers that chose
responses (1), (2), and (5) creates a sample of farmers that believe they
possess the right to transfer or lease their land use rights to another villager,
whether subject to registration, approval, or no conditions. From such a
sample, it is clear that the strong majority of farmers in all 17 provinces
believe that they have the right to transfer or lease their land use rights to
another villager, with a range within the 17 provinces from Guangxi (72.3%)
to Zhejiang (98.8%).
J.

InheritanceofLand Use Rights

At the province level, farmers' belief in their right to pass land use
rights to their children by inheritance deviated substantially from the mean
in only five provinces. High percentages of farmers believing that they
possess such rights were found in Guizhou (92.9% of farmers reporting that
their rights could be passed on to children by inheritance), Anhui (85.7%)
and Fujian (82.2%). Low percentages of farmers possessing this belief were
found in Shandong (29.3%) and Henan (35.6%).
V.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the process of conducting and analyzing the results of the 17
province survey, we have developed the following 13 conclusions and
recommendations. Our recommendations focus only on issues on which we
have concluded that ameliorative actions would have a substantial positive
impact upon farmers' confidence in 30-year land use rights:
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Continue Systematic Assessment and Monitoring ofImplementation of
30-Year Land Use Rights

We recommend that the central government undertake a continuing
round of nationwide surveys to monitor implementation of the law until full
53
implementation has been achieved in at least 80% of villages nationwide.
For the purpose of the central government's monitoring program, we
propose that "full implementation" should be considered achieved only
where farmers have actually received a 30-year land use contract, and that
contract either does not contain provisions permitting land readjustments
during the 30-year land use term, or legal rules have been adopted (as
suggested in subsection D, infra this Part) that substantially limit and clarify
the meaning of such contractual language.
In addition to measuring the extent of "full implementation," this
monitoring should also investigate the extent of "full confidence." Since
farmers, even those who possess a 30-year land use contract, will not make
long-term investments in their land unless they feel confident they will be
able to reap the benefits of those investments, it is essential that the central
government continue to assess the extent of "full confidence," defined in
terms of the two categories used to represent high confidence in the present
analysis. 54 We recommend that the central government continue its
monitoring effort until at least 75% of the farmers who report full
implementation of 30-year land use rights also indicate "full confidence," as
thus defined, in their land tenure security.
Assessments of the progress towards both "full implementation" and
"full confidence" should be carried out at least twice a year until at least the
"80%" and "75%" goals described above have been reached. Such randomsample surveys should include at least the same 17 provinces as our survey,
and preferably should include all provinces and province-level
municipalities. Although the 100 household sample size used in the present
survey provides highly accurate data at the national level and useful data at
the provincial level, a sample size of 150 or 200 households per province

53The survey questionnaire we used could be used as a model (with perhaps some minor changes to
the language of the questionnaire and appropriate training of survey personnel) for such a monitoring
program.

34 High confidence includes those farmers who responded that there will definitely not be any future
land readjustments and those farmers responding that future land readjustments "depend on the central

government (higher levels of government)." We offer a further refinement of this concept in the case that
measures strictly limiting future small readjustments. See infra note 59.
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would be desirable, to give province-level results statistically accurate to
within a smaller range of error. 55
B.

The Central Government Should Inform the Provinces of its Intent to
Continue Independent Monitoring the Implementation of 30-Year
Land Use Rights, and Should Actively Discourage Inflated Claims
ConcerningImplementation

As noted in Part II, above, several provinces began making claims
concerning "full implementation" of 30-year rural land use rights in over
90% of villages province-wide as early as November 1998. Our preliminary
fieldwork results, and the results of the survey show that only 3 of the 17
provinces had achieved implementation, even as judged by the low threshold
of contract issuance without regard to contract content, in as many as 50% of
villages province-wide by August 1999. Judging by this level of progress, it
is extremely unlikely that most provinces could have achieved "full
implementation" of 30-year rural land use rights by the end of 1999.
As of the December 31, 1999 deadline for "full implementation"
declared at the 1998 Central Rural Work Conference, all of China's
provinces began reporting their progress on implementation, judged in'terms
of the percentage of villages province-wide that have achieved "full
implementation."
The central government should inform province
governments that it plans to continue monitoring of implementation
throughout the year 2000, and discourage the provinces from making
inflated claims concerning implementation.
It is important to note that reaching a level of implementation that is
less than "full implementation" of 30-year land use rights in 100% of
villages nationwide by the end of 1999 should not be viewed as a policy
failure. Indeed, given the scale of the effort required, actually achieving
"full implementation" of 30-year land use rights in China by the end of 1999
would have been nothing short of miraculous. The important thing is for the
central government to continue to assess the realistic progress of
implementation throughout the country and to exert its full influence to
ensure that "full implementation" is achieved in the most timely manner
possible.

5 Our sample of 100 is considered accurate to within ± 9.8% in 95 cases out of 100. For a sample of

150, the percentage is ± 8.0%, and for a sample of 200, it is ± 6.9%.
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Continue and Expand the PublicInformation Campaign

The national campaign to publicize the existence of the 30-year rural
land use right policy has been highly successful, with 92% of farmers
reporting awareness of the 30-year no-readjustment policy, and the ratio of
farmers approving of the policy versus those disapproving greater than 7:1.
The existing campaign should be continued, and should be most heavily
targeted at those areas of China where implementation has proceeded at a
slower pace.
We further recommend that the scope of the ongoing public
information campaign should be expanded to provide farmers with
additional information related to the process of implementing 30-year land
use rights, including what constitutes full implementation, and what recourse
they have if their rights are violated during the implementation process. At
the same time, higher-level authorities should inform local cadres that if they
violate the letter or spirit of the Land Management Law or related policy
directives, they will be subject to strict penalties pursuant to the Land
Management Law.
Because farmers themselves identified television as the most effective
medium in publicizing the existence of the 30-year land use right policy, we
recommend that this "second generation" public information campaign also
adopt television as its primary medium. The campaign should also gain
special intensity in those provinces that have been slow to implement 30year rights, or have done so in a manner that involves frequent violations of
central laws and policies.
D.

ForthcomingLegislation on Rural Land Use Rights Should Prohibit
or, at a Minimum, Provide Detailed Guidelines that Strictly Limit,
Land Readjustments Duringthe 30-Year Land Use Term

The present lack of clarity in central laws and policies impacts the
extent to which land readjustments are permitted during the 30-year land use
term and thus impedes farmers' confidence in their 30-year land use rights.
Although Article 14 of the Land Management Law unambiguously prohibits
any further big readjustments during the 30-year use term, existing legal and
policy provisions fail to clearly resolve the question of whether, and if so,
under what circumstances, small readjustments may continue during the 30year land use term. The results of the 17 province survey indicate that this
lack of clarity in central laws and policies often leads to the inclusion of
provisions permitting land readjustments in farmers' land use contracts and

PACIFIC RIM LAW

& POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 9 No. 3

the adoption of small readjustments as a measure to resolve land and
population contradictions. This lack of clarity thus threatens to undermine
the basic objective of implementing 30-year land use rights: providing
farmers with the level of land tenure security required to make long-term
productivity enhancing investments on their land.
To address the threat to land tenure security created by unclear rules
concerning small readjustments, forthcoming legislation governing rural
land use rights should either prohibit readjustments entirely during the 30year term or strictly define and limit the land that may be readjusted during
the 30-year term. If any specific parcel of land is potentially redistributable
as part of a future readjustment, that parcel of land cannot give its present
cultivator security. As a result, it is extremely unlikely that any such parcel
would be the subject of significant investments by the cultivator, or of
significant increases in production. Use rights to that parcel also cannot be
transferred by the cultivators to another person for a period extending
beyond the earliest date at which a readjustment might occur.
Given the negative impact of readjustment on land tenure security and
agricultural productivity, it is not surprising that the concept of land
readjustment does not exist in any of the world's modem agricultural
systems. Prohibiting land readjustments during the 30-year land use term, in
any form and under any circumstances, would therefore be most consistent
with the practice of the world's most advanced and productive agricultural
systems. It is a practice that has been in place since the beginning of the
Household Responsibility System in at least 18% of the survey villages (a
finding that should be valid to ± 2.4% for the 17 provinces as a whole), 6 and
in these villages it is correlated with much higher farmer confidence that
their 30-year land use rights will not be subject to readjustment during the
30-year land use term. Because of the present wording of Article 14 of the
Land Management Law, which allows "appropriate isolated readjustments of
land" during the 30-year period (upon a two-thirds vote by the villagers or
villager representatives and both township and county-level approval),
ending readjustments would require an amendment to the law or the issuance
of legislation that supercedes the Land Management Law on this particular
point.
However, if an absolute prohibition on readjustments during the 30year term is impossible, forthcoming legislation should strictly define and
56 A survey of 1,621 households gives results that should be valid for the entire population ± 2.4%,
in 95 cases out of 100. The 17 surveyed provinces, as previously noted, contain over 90% of China's entire
rural population.
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limit the circumstances under which small readjustments may continue to
occur. Since average village population growth in China is unlikely to be
more than 10 percent during the 30 years 1999-2029, and is more likely to
be five percent or less, 57 small readjustments should be limited in a manner
that only a corresponding amount of land remains subject to the possibility
of redistribution to meet the needs of new population. The current lack of
clear limits on small readjustments, which effectively leaves 100 percent of
the arable land at risk of cumulative periodic readjustments to meet the
potential needs of an increase in village population of 10 percent or less,
exacts a huge and wholly unnecessary cost in terms of lost land security, lost
land investment, and lost land production.
If any small readjustments are permitted to continue, we recommend
that three important principles be adopted into law in order to limit the
amount of village arable land that is subject to readjustment while
simultaneously preserving the ability to meet the needs of potential future
population increases. The first of these principles would limit the maximum
amount of land subject to readjustment during the 30-year land use term to
one-half of one land share per village household. No household could lose
more than one-half of one land share to readjustment during the 30-year land
use term. With an average of around four land shares per household, 8 this
57 The highest projection for growth of China's rural population that seems remotely realistic is the
"medium" projection from a study on China's rural population. ZHONGGUO NONGCUN RENKOU YANJIU
[STUDY ON CHINA'S RURAL POPULATION] 259 (Chunyuan Zhang ed., China Population Publishing House,

1994). Interpolating for projected growth of rural population from 2000 until 2030 (projections made are
for 2000 and 2035), the expectation would be for growth of 10-11% during that 30-year period. However,
Zhang's study was published in 1994, and even by 1998 the actual figures appear to show a significantly
slower growth in rural population than interpolation from Zhang's projections. For 1998 figures, see Mr.
Yang Kuifu, Representative of China & Vice Minister State Family Planning Commission, Statement at the
Thirty Second Session United Nations Commission on Population & Development (New York, Mar. 22,
1999) availablein <http://www.sfpc.gov.cn/ yang.html> (rural population estimate of 870 million, a data
series that is slightly higher for all years than FAO agricultural population figures, described in the
following paragraph).
For a more current estimate, see UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, 1998
PRODUCTION YEARBOOK, tbl.3 (figures for China's 1990 and 1998 agricultural population). If one simply

makes a straight-line projection from the FAO's 1990 agriculture population figure of 834.6 million and its
1998 figure of 854.5 million, the eight-year growth was around 2.4% and the average annual growth around
0.3%, so the growth over the next 30 years would be between 9 and 10 percent. This would be very close
to the projection just described. However, if one includes the figure for agricultural population in the
intermediate year of 1995, which the FAO also shows (850.3 million), it becomes evident that growth has
been slowing. The increase over 1990-95 was 1.87%, or 0.38% per year, while that for 1995-98 was 0.5%,
or 0.17% per year. If we project from the most recent three-year actual figures, the growth over 30 years
would be about 5%, even if we assume that there will be no further decline in rate of growth of agricultural
population. Indeed, one massive demographic study published in 1994, projects very substantial reductions
in China's rural population over the next 30 years 2000-2030. See KUA SHIJI DE ZHONGGUO RENKOU (THE
CHINESE POPULATION TOWARD THE 21 n CENTURY] (Sun et al. eds., 1994).

58 Our survey found a present average of about 4.42 members and 3.85 land shares per household.
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would make approximately one-eighth of arable land shares, or 12.5% of
arable land in an average village, available for readjustment during the 30year term. Such an amount of available arable land, when combined with
the five percent of village land that can be reserved as Flexible Land to meet
population increase, should more than adequately meet the changing
population needs of most Chinese villages during the period from 1999 to
2029.
Second, households that have lost a family member during the 30-year
term through death or marriage, and therefore will be losing land through a
small readjustment, would be allowed to select which land (equivalent in
area to one-half of one land share) would be redistributed through the
readjustment. In this way, the present cultivator will be able to make
investment decisions on all of his land while knowing that only a small part
of the land, which he will have the right to identify when the time comes, is
subject to readjustment.
Third, each additional member of the village collective arriving after
the initiation of the 30-year term, and falling within the scope of the family
planning policy, would be entitled to receive a land share equal to one-half
of one original land share. By accommodating two new village members
with land equivalent in area to one original land share, a balance can be
maintained between providing for new members and protecting the land
tenure security of the original cultivators. 59
The legislation should also clearly provide that the farmers may
decide to have no readjustment at all during the 30 year, extending a practice
already followed in some 18% of Chinese villages.
E.

Require that All 30-Year Land Use Contracts ContainingProvisions
Permitting Land Readjustments must be Applied According to the
ProposedNew Legal Rules ConcerningReadjustments

The survey results indicate that about one quarter of issued contracts
(25.6%) contain a provision allowing small readjustments during the 30-year
term, and the presence of such a provision is correlated with a dramatic
decline in farmers' confidence. 60 Addressing this issue is, indeed, even more
59 If principles such as those suggested are embodied in law, strictly defining limits of future small
readjustments, the definition of"full confidence" used in monitoring farmers' 30-year land use rights and
the corresponding questions in the survey questionnaire, should be refined to include all cases where the
farmer is aware of the new limitation and believes it will be applied.
60 A further 3.9% of issued contracts contain a clearly illegal provision requiring small readjustments
during the 30-year term. Still another 14.0% contain internally inconsistent provisions on land
readjustnents during the 30-year term.
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crucial than insisting on the issuance of contracts, since farmers who had not
been issued a land use contract at all reported greater confidence in their 30year use rights than farmers who had been issued a contract that purports to
be for 30 years, but allows readjustments during the 30-year period.
If forthcoming legislation prohibits or strictly limits land
readjustments during the 30-year land use term, the central government
should require that any existing contract provision allowing small
readjustments must be read and applied under the new rules and any new
contracts issued must incorporate the specifications of the new rules. The
central government should further publicize that any contract provision
allowing big readjustments during the 30-year term is illegal and invalid,
and can lead to strict penalties pursuant to the Land Management Law for
any person involved in drafting or issuing such a contract.
F.

Prohibit Villages from Adopting the Measure of Readjustments
Duringthe 30-Year Land Use Term Outside the ContractFramework

Some farmers reported that, as part of the implementation process,
their village had adopted the measure of conducting land readjustments
during the 30-year term outside the framework of land use contracts. In a
small minority of cases, this has involved adopting the measure of big
readjustments during the 30-year period, which is a violation of the Land
Management Law, and should be both publicized and redressed through the
penalty provisions of the law. In a higher proportion of instances, farmers
reported that their village had adopted the measure of small readjustments
during the 30-year land use term.
The adoption of such a measure as to future small readjustments
outside the framework of the contract resulted in a significant decrease in
farmers' land tenure security. It should follow that this important element
must not be left to actions outside the framework of the actual contract and
of the texts of the legal rules. If forthcoming legislation prohibits or strictly
limits small readjustments during the 30-year use term, this should be
intensively publicized, together with the fact that no measure that departs
from such rules can be adopted or enforced, whether outside the framework
of the actual contract or as part of it.
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Adopt and Issue a Standardized National 30-Year Land Use Right
Contract

Both the need for clear guidance on land readjustments during the
61
in contract terms
30-year term and the extensive local variations
(including the frequent inclusion of readjustment provisions) strongly
support the need for the central government to adopt and issue a
standardized national 30-year land use contract. Thus, we recommend
that the central government issue and widely publicize, in the form of
forthcoming legislation on rural land use rights, both a model contract
and a set of core requirements for compliant contracts. The minimum
core requirements for such standardized contracts should include the
following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

Identification of the parties to the contract;
A description of the contracted land;
The contracted land use purposes;
The duration of the contract;
The rights and responsibilities of the parties to the contract;
Rules concerning land transfers during the 30-year term;
Rules concerning the extent, if any, to which land
readjustments can occur during the 30-year use term;
Rules concerning state takings and collective withdrawals of
land use rights during the 30-year land use term;
Liabilities for breach of contract;
Provisions concerning resolution of any disputes related to
the contract; and
The signature or seal of both parties to the contract.

are pursuing analysis of the survey results as to variation in the terms of issued contracts. It is
already clear, however, both from initial review of the survey data on this subject and from our Rapid Rural
61 We

Appraisal fieldwork that there is wide, confusing, and unnecessary variation in the contents of issued
contracts. Presently, contract documents are often separately prepared even at the township level, so that
even at the county level there may be an absence of uniformity or predictability.
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Introduce Systematic Village-By- Village Confirmation of Contract
Issuance

The issuance of land use contracts that do not provide for the
possibility of ongoing land readjustments is associated with a very
substantial increase in farmer confidence.
As of August 1999, three-fifths of villages in the 17 survey provinces
had not issued contracts. Issuance of contracts, however, is a specific and
verifiable fact that can be readily monitored. An important step towards
ensuring that full implementation has occurred and towards preventing
inflated claims by provincial and local officials, would thus be for the central
government to require every county-level government to ascertain, through
targeted monitoring interviews, how many administrative villages in the
county have actually issued 30-year use contracts to farmers. This would
require designated county officials to personally visit each village and
interview one randomly selected farmer. The official would first ask the
farmer whether he or another household member had signed and received a
copy of a 30-year land use rights contract from the collective landowner. If
the farmer or another household member had indeed received such a
contract, the county official would request that the farmer produce the
contract so that he could verify that it is a contract for 30-year land use
rights. 62 Unlike the longer and more detailed interviews on the nature and
extent of implementation, the presence of local cadre is unimportant to
ascertain contract issuance, since the farmer either produces a copy of a 30year contract or doesn't. It is important, however, to ensure that the county
official sees the farmer's own copy of the land use right contract, and not a
copy that the village cadre produces from his own house or office.
These brief and low-cost surveys, if conducted in every village within
a given county, would provide the county government with a detailed
understanding of whether the vital steps up to and including actual contract
issuance had been taken by the villages within its jurisdiction. Based on
these results, the county government should be required to submit a written
report to the provincial government listing the villages that have not yet
issued 30-year land use right contracts and detailing the steps that the county

62 If the first farmer cannot find his contract, a second and third randomly chosen farmer should be
asked. If one contract is found in the hands of a randomly chosen farmer, it is almost certain that such
contracts have been issued throughout the village. If no farmer asked can produce a contract (asking up to
three), it is highly likely that no contracts have been issued.
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government will take to ensure full implementation in all such villages in a
manner consistent with the Land Management Law.63
Once the province has collected the results from each county, it
should submit them to the central government. These province-wide figures
can then be compared with the results of the more detailed sample surveys,
which will provide qualitative data as to the contents of the issued contracts
as well as comparison data on the percent of contracts issued.
.

Enforce Limits on FlexibleLand

Under existing rules, no more than five percent of village arable land
is allowed to be Flexible Land, it must be used to solve contradictions
between village population and land, and it is not to be introduced or
64 The
increased in the process of implementing 30-year land use rights.
results of the 17-province survey show that many villages have exceeded the
five percent limit for Flexible Land, and suggest that Flexible Land may
often be used for purposes other than those envisioned by current policies.
Our analysis of the survey results to date, however, does not show
systematic linkages between farmer confidence and the local regime of
Flexible Land. While violations of the five percent limit on Flexible Land
may not affect farmers' confidence with respect to their use rights on arable
land allocated with 30-year land use rights land, it is clear that any land
designated as "Flexible Land" has not, by definition, itself been allocated to
farmers under 30-year land use rights.
Thus, the most important issue under this point is withholding of
excessive land as Flexible Land, and thereby not making it available for
long-term allocation that will motivate farmer investment in that land. Here,
the survey findings do not indicate widespread substantial increases in the
amount of Flexible Land during implementation of 30-year rights; what the
survey results do indicate, however, is that approximately one of six of the
63 Village leaders of such villages should be told that they have a specified number of days (the
number will depend on whether a small readjustment may still need to be carried out, and whether crops are

in the ground, but the time period should not exceed 180 days at most) to issue the contracts to farmers. At
the end of that time, county officials should again visit all of the previous non-complying villages, and ask

another randomly selected farmer (and if necessary a second and a third farmer) the questions as to
possession of a 30-year use contract. Leaders of villages that are still not in compliance should be invited

to a meeting in the county seat with senior county officials, asked to explain the reasons for their noncompliance, and required to sign a statement confirming that they will issue contracts within 30 days

(extensions of time should be given only for extraordinary reasons, such as natural disasters). Any further
non-compliance, confirmed by still another visit by county officials to any such remaining villages, should
be met with fines, dismissal from office, and other penalties.
" See Central Committee Document No. 16, supranote 7.
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villages that currently reserve Flexible Land have reserved more than 10%
of village arable land as Flexible Land. Since 31.1% of farmers reported
that their village currently reserves Flexible Land, this means that about five
percent of villages nationwide have reserved excess amounts of Flexible
Land.65
We recommend two approaches with respect to Flexible Land. First,
the existing central government policy on Flexible Land should be codified
in forthcoming legislation governing rural land use rights. Second, in cases
where villages continue to reserve amounts of land greatly in excess of five
percent of village arable land, higher levels of government should require
that the excess land be allocated equally among village farmers with 30-year
land use rights.
J.

Strongly EncourageEnding the Two-Field System

Nearly three-quarters of Two-Field villages that have conducted a
readjustment as part of the process of implementing 30-year land use rights,
have included responsibility land in that readjustment, effectively ending the
Two-Field System. The survey results show that ending the Two-Field
System results in a substantial increase in farmers' land tenure security.
This trend towards ending the Two-Field System can be further encouraged
in the approximately one-sixth of villages that, as the survey shows, continue
to employ the Two-Field System by: (1) widely publicizing that most
villages are in fact ending the Two-Field System as part of implementing 30year land rights; (2) reiterating the central government policy greatly
restricting the Two-Field System contained in Central Committee Document
No. 16 (under which the Two-Field System cannot be introduced where it
does not presently exist, and must be ended wherever introduced without
farmers' agreement); and (3) clarifying that, in any case, any existing
responsibility land must, pursuant to Article 14 of the Land Management
Law and related policy documents, be allocated on an egalitarian basis (per
capita or per laborer), without any special fees or charges, and for a 30-year
period.

65 There is a related, highly important issue as to whether cadres regard this excess Flexible Land as
readily available for transfer to non-agricultural uses: we are continuing our analysis of the survey results
that may possibly bear upon this question.
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Further Reinforce Farmers' Right to Pass Land Use Rights by
Inheritance

K.

Farmers who believe that their land use rights include the right to pass
on those rights to their children by inheritance reported much greater
confidence in their tenure security during the 30-year term than either
farmers who did not believe that their land use rights include such a right or
farmers who did not know whether their land use rights include such a right.
The survey results show that nearly three out of five farmers (58.8%) believe
that their land use rights include such a right to pass by inheritance. The
existing relevant legal rules concerning inheritance neither explicitly
confirm nor deny farmers' right to pass their land use rights by inheritance.
However, the practice of withdrawal of land use rights by the collective
owner upon the death of a collective member is widespread. The inheritance
right should consist of the right to pass any remaining unexpired term of the
land-use right to the farmers' children. For example, a farmer whose landuse contact runs from 1999 to 2029 and who dies in 2015, for example,
should be able to pass the remaining 14 years of his land-use term (2015 to
2029) on to his children. Both husbands and wives would possess this right
to pass their land rights on to their children.
We recommend that the central government take at least three specific
steps to increase farmers' assurance that they have such a right: (1) confirm
the existence of the right to pass land use rights through inheritance in the
forthcoming legislation governing rural land use rights; (2) include the
existence of such a right in the "second generation" publicity campaign; and
(3) specifically affirm such rights in the land-use contract, including a
standard contract if one is adopted.67

6

Neither the 1985 Inheritance Law of the PRC nor the Land Management Law contain specific

provisions either allowing or prohibiting the inheritance of rural land use rights. See generally (Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Jicheng Fa) [Inheritance Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted April 10,
1985) available in LEXIS-NEXIS online database, BBCSWB library; Land Management Law, supra note

1. However, the 1993 PRC Agriculture Law does contain the following language with respect to
agricultural work contracts: "in the event of a passing away during the contract, the contract may be
continued by [the contractor's] heirs." See Agricultural Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted
1993)1. This provision, at least arguably, suggests an intent that rural land use rights should be inheritable.
The fact that contract provisions allowing readjustments are associated with a loss in confidence
further underlines the importance of the steps recommended in Parts V.D and V.E. See also supra note 43.
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Include a Provision in Forthcoming Legislation Governing Rural
Land Use Rights that Gives Farmers the Legal Right to Retain Their
Land Use Rights if Their Household Registration Changes

As in the case of inheritability, farmers who believe that they will
retain their land use rights if their household registration changes from rural
to urban indicated much higher confidence in their land tenure security than
either farmers who believed that they did not have this right or farmers who
did not know whether they had this right. Here 53.7% of farmers believe
their land use rights will be retained upon change of registration.
Confidence was highest when farmers believed that land use rights would be
retained without imposition of any increased contract fees (see Table 19).
Current laws governing rural land use rights are silent on the question of
whether land use rights can be retained upon changes in household
registration. 68 Discussions with local cadres in the course of our Rapid
Rural Appraisal work over a number of years, however, have indicated that
many such cadres take the view that farmers' land use rights are lost if
household registration changes.
Here again, three steps would be important to increase farmers'
assurance that they have the right to retain their land use rights if their
household registration changes: (1) specify this right (and that the retention
of land use rights is not subject to imposition of increased burdens or fees) in
the forthcoming legislation governing rural land use rights; (2) at least after
such a clarification has been made, specifically affirm such rights in the
land-use contract, including a standard contract if one is adopted, and (3) at
least after a clarification has been made, include the existence of such a right
in the "second generation" publicity campaign.69
M.

Forthcoming Legislation Governing Rural Land Use Rights Should
Include a Clearerand More Comprehensive Definition of the Specific
Rights Incorporatedby the Term "RuralLand Use Rights"

The two preceding recommendations clearly illustrate that the
presence or absence of a certain right within the bundle of rights that
68 Neither

the Land Management Law nor any other legislation of which we are aware addresses the

question of farmers' right to retain their rural land use rights upon changes in household registration.
69 Once again, it should be emphasized that the presence of a provision in the land use right contract

that allows readjustments during the 30-year term is associated with the loss of most or all of the increased
confidence that otherwise comes when farmers believe that rights are retained despite change in household
registration.
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constitutes a "rural land use right" will fundamentally alter Chinese farmers'
perceptions of land tenure security. The current body of Chinese law
governing rural land use rights, drawn from a variety of sources, leaves
important questions regarding the composition of rural land use rights
unanswered. On some issues, such as land use right transfers, current law
provides for the existence of such a right, but fails to provide any guidance
concerning the scope of the right. On other issues, such as the right to retain
land use rights upon changes in household registration, the current body of
law remains silent.
We recommend that a clear and comprehensive definition of each of
the elements of rural land use rights addressed by the survey be included in
forthcoming legislation governing rural land use rights. These elements
include: (1) the right to transfer land use rights to other villagers; (2) the
right to transfer land use rights to non-members of the rural collective; (3)
the right to pass along land use rights to children through inheritance; (4) the
right to retain land use rights upon changes in household registration status;
(5) the right to mortgage rural land use rights; and (6) the right to transfer the
entirety of one's land use right term. It is important to note that defining
"rural land use rights" as a form of property right rather than a contract right
will facilitate the process of devising a uniform definition of each of these
rights, and will help to prevent the development of varying local approaches
to such rights.70

70 For additional discussion of the importance of defining Chinese rural land use rights as property,

rather than contract rights, see Tim Hanstad & Guiping Lu, Rural Land Use Rights: Property or Contract
Rights?, in CHINA'S RURAL LAND SYSTEM: LEGAL REFORM AND THE RULE OF LAW (Hanstad &
Schwarzwalder ed., 1999) (unpublished report prepared as part of a policy research project conducted by
the China Institute for Reform and Development and funded by the United Nations Development Program
(CPR/96/509)).

